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GOOD GOVERNANCE AS A COUNTER INSURGENCY
AGENDA TO OPPOSITIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIVE
SOCIAL PROJECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
James Thuo Gathii*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I examine the policy implications of the position
adopted by the World Bank to the effect that human rights goals
cannot be achieved at the cost of its economic and financial mandate
under its Articles of Agreement. This view of the Bank on the role
of human rights in its work has made it difficult for human rights
advocacy to position itself as lending independent critiques of the
World Bank's development policies, such as those associated with the
New International Economic Order (NIEO), or post second world war
efforts to give international law a 'new' social character. Instead,
through the good governance agenda, human rights advocacy has, far
from adopting an outsider or independent critique to the neo-liberal
* Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University,
S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 1999; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1995;
LL.B. University of Nairobi, 1992; Crowe and Dunlevy Visiting International
Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Fall 1997. I would like to
thank Celestine Nyamu, Antony Anghie, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, David Kennedy,
Nathaniel Berman and Wayne Eastman for their comments on various drafts of this
paper. I would also like to thank Robert Baumol for his research assistance. This
article is one in a series in my current research project that critically examines a
variety of post-debt crisis legal and economic reform proposals imposed upon sub-
Saharan African economies resulting in two outcomes: first, in disabling
governmental capacity to enhance social justice, and second, that in seeking to
improve well being in Africa, proposals such as human rights are not effective
because they do not challenge the underlying distribution of wealth and power in
national and international society -- which I identify as the most significant
problems facing African countries. Other articles in the series include: Corruption
and Donor Reform: Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law
as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kenya, CONN. J. INT'L L. (1999);
Representations of Afica in Good Governance Discourse: Policing and
Containing to Neo-Liberalism, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. (1999) and The Limits
of the New International Rule of Law, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES: (E.K. Quashigah & Obiora
Okafor eds., 1999)[hereinafter LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA].
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economic policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMiF), adopted an approach based on finding complementarity
and compatibility between human rights advocacy and the economic
and financial policies of the World Bank and the IMF.
This new approach is popularized for desirably abandoning
hostile or uncompromising opposition to neo-liberal economic
policies in particular, and the ascendancy of capitalist economic
policies internationally in general. Neo-liberal economic policies are
mainly preoccupied with displacing statist regulatory interventions in
the market place while integrating national economies into the
international market economy with little or no constraints on the flow
of international capital. Neo-liberal economic reform is also
characterized as an antidote to previous approaches to development
policy that acknowledged the centrality of welfare concerns alongside
the imperatives of growth in development policy. In sub-Saharan
Africa, neo-liberal economic policy had been experienced under
difference labels including structural adjustment. Today, however,
good governance is the contemporary label for this expanding agenda.
In this article I argue that good governance serves as the
World Bank's short hand for measuring which parts of the human
rights agenda are compatible or consistent with its financial and
economic mandate. This requirement, I argue, severely constrains the
possibilities within the good governance agenda that prior
development policies offered human rights advocates and activists.
Prior development policies offered those who supported a human
rights agenda in development to demand welfare concerns defined in
terms of basic needs from the state and institutions of development.
The good governance agenda however, has changed this post second
world war growth/distribution welfare state compromise through its
stigmatization of protective governmental interventions in the
economy as necessarily inimical to economic growth and freedom.
Good governance policies are thus based in at least three contestable
assumptions: first, that reducing governmental interventions in the
economy would automatically lead to increases in economic growth
and personal freedom; second, that governmental interventions in the
economy including those intended to redress social division,
hierarchy and inequality in society are inefficient or profit-
GOOD GOVERNANCE
constraining; and third, that a redistribution of income in favor of
profit or capital by the removal of such profit-constraining
regulations including those that support welfare needs or rights is a
necessary cost that a society must bear in order to produce a higher
rate of investment, productivity, growth and profit.
It is therefore my argument that the explicit reference to
human rights and democratization in the good governance agenda
needs to be understood in the context of good governance or neo-
liberal economic restructuring, particularly its concern with
demonstrating the adverse effects of governmental interventions in
the economy. In this sense, the explicit reference to human rights in
the good governance agenda invariably lends credence to the anti-
statist neo-liberal agenda: Granted the history of abuses committed by
sub-Saharan African states, the World Bank's instrumental co-option
of rights within the good governance agenda lends moral credibility
to the World Bank in general. While the good governance agenda
does not itself constitute a legally binding commitment that the World
Bank would independently use to promote human rights, it could use
its economic leverage on developing countries to withhold extension
of credits to governments that default on internationally recognized
human rights principles. However, violations of human rights do not
automatically trigger exercise of this leverage, instead, there has to be
a connection to the Bank's economic and financial mandate before
this leverage could be exercised.
Finally, I argue that good governance proposals may also be
regarded as a political compromise or avenue through which those
who continue to lose out under the stringent neo-liberal economic
programs can consent to their control by the owners of the means of
production. Human rights and political democracy in so far as they
have become a part of the conservative economic commitments of
neo-liberal economic reform are some of its primary instruments of
legitimization that permit individuals and groups that lose out in the
economic reform process to press their claims to the allocation of
resources and the distribution of output, even when the economic and
political system is being shut out from addressing these claims. The
good governance project, in short, plays a major role in managing and
soothing the injustices and antagonisms of daily life now exacerbated
1999
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by the implementation of neo-liberal economic restructuring. Yet,
paradoxically the liberties protected by the commitments to human
rights and political democracy in the good governance agenda also
give these politically disenfranchized citizenry liberties that they were
often denied under the authoritarianism that accompanied the
developmentalism of the 1970s and the 1980s.
In part II of this article, I critically examine various initiatives
to revitalize international law in the post World War II period
especially in the 1960s and 1970s. At the outset, I contrast the
initiatives launched to give international law a social dimension with
the more radical goals of the NIEO. I then trace the rise of the basic
needs critique of development defined as economic growth within the
framework of the World Bank and national economic policies
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. I then trace the attempts of
international human rights advocacy to radicalize the basic needs
agenda by seeking to replace its needs language with what they
perceived to be the compelling and authoritative discourse of rights.
In part III, I critically evaluate how the rise if the good
governance agenda in the 1990s eclipsed the initiatives to give
international law a social character. In seeking to so eclipse the gains
of the growth/distribution compromise of the post World War II
period, I demonstrate how the institutional mandate of the World
Bank and the IMF have become the template forjustifying only those
rights claims that are consistent with a development policy that gives
priority to returns to investment, growth, productivity and profit at the
expense of social welfare entitlements.
In part IV, I conclude by arguing that the good governance
agenda as well as the weak version of the basic needs/rights critique
of development defined in terms of economic growth, unfortunately
share a belief in the positive potential of their present national and
international arrangements and their commitment to development. I
question this faith by point into the limited possibilities offered by
their reform proposals: that all that needs to be done is to minimally
tinker with these institutions, redesign their priorities without giving
up the priority of growth over equity concerns or to merely rearrange
the implementation of their pre-designed development programs by
seeing citizen participation and consultation. I call for a thorough re-
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examination of this institutional fetishism as a pre-condition for the
emergence of development programs that are truly emancipatory
granted the deep inequalities of wealth, gender, sex, race, power and
influence in national and international society.
II. CONTRASTING POST WORLD WAR II INITIATIVES TO
REVITALIZE INTERNATIONAL LAW
After World War II, international lawyers committed to
political and social issues, such as environmentalism and the
protection of human, political, and economic rights, became involved
in projects to advance these causes. That is, international law became
increasingly more pragmatic, deployed to serve social causes beyond
its traditional focus of avoiding war, advocating peace and
international cooperation on technical issues.' International law was
' These efforts were diverse and varied. For example there was the social
democratic vision of Louis Sohn. See Louis Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on
Human Development, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 423,461 (1973). Professor Sohn says
the following of the Stockholm Declaration: it stresses the "new social character
of international law, which no longer protects the lucky few, but instead provides
for more distributive justice." Id. at 461. Then there was the pragmatism of
Wolfgang Friedman, who expressed this new pragmatism (requiring international
cooperation among nations to help solve potentially disastrous problems such as
pollution and nuclear destruction and population explosion) and concern for the
individual as being necessary to ensure survival (and as such to avoid the
extinction) of the international order. Friedman is also concerned to sensitize
international law to the needs of the then newly independent countries of Asia and
Africa. Unlike Louis Sohn, Friedman did not fully endorse the socialist
implications of Sohn's liberal democratic vision. Argued Friedman, "the concept
of planning still evokes instinctive opposition on the part of nations, groups, and
individuals who for a variety of reasons identify planning with socialism (which
is in turn equated with communism) and the destruction of human freedom."
Wolfgang Friedman, The Reality oflnternationalLaw- A Reappraisal, 10 COLUM.
J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (1971). Wolfgang sums up his pragmatism as follows:
It is in this direction rather than in blueprints for a worldwide
military security force that the main hope lies for the
development of an international legal system that will
correspond to the needs of a society which is anachronistically
1999
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becoming infused with a 'new' sense of social character. This shift
is often represented as a clash between a 'set of forms or legal
divided into more than one hundred and thirty 'sovereign' states,
but which is, for the fateful questions of survival or extinction,
indivisible. Unless social and legal organization catches up with
the physical and technological realities of our time, the prospects
for survival are indeed slender.
Id. at 60. In another article, Friedman expressed this view as follows:
Human welfare cannot be dealt with on a national level any
more than protection against nuclear destruction... The greatest
challenge to contemporary mankind is presented by the
realization that a minimum level in the conservation of human
resources is no less a matter of survival than the prevention of
nuclear war...and that in both respects the organization of
international society based upon the national sovereign state is
disastrously inadequate.
Wolfgang Friedman, HalfA Century of International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1354
(1964). He goes on to state: "But the greatest development of the postwar era lies
in the concept of international economic development aid as a permanent and
inevitable feature of contemporary international organizations." Id. at 1355. See
also WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1964); The Relevance of International Law to the Processes of Economic and
Social Development, 60 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 8 (1966). Richard Falk's
work also fits within this tradition although he is perhaps more to the left of Louis
Sohn's social democratic vision, and Friedman's Frankfurt school liberalism. For
example, Falk argued that international law was shifting away from being merely
concerned with avoiding war to improving the world by reducing economic
inequality. In so doing, international law would thus indirectly help avoid war and
revolution. He quotes from a papal encyclical to argue that it is the imbalance
between the objective requirements of human welfare and the stark realities of
national power that account for the dramatic culmination of the Pope's encyclical,
Pacem in Terris. See RICHARD FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1970). For a contemporary third world critical initiative to give
legitimacy to international law by re-orienting the source of international law's
legitimacy to 'ordinary' people. See Obiora Okafor, Is There A Legitimacy Deficit
in International Legal Scholarship and Practice, 13 INT'L INSIGHTS 91 (Special
Issue); The Global Process ofLegitimacy and the Ideology of Global Governance,
14 ARz. J. INT'L COMP. L 117-24 (1997). See also LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA, supra note 1.
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constructs,' such as sovereignty and the non-interference norm, on the
one hand, and a 'set of sociological and political sensitivities' such as
environmentalism and human rights, on the other.2 This new social
character of international law can be seen through the debates, during
the post-World War H era, on the reformulation of international law
from a state-centered agenda, focused on the classical doctrines of
state sovereignty and territoriality, and the regulation of relations
between states, to an individual-centered concept, that is more
concerned with the identification and protection of the social,
political, and economic rights of the individual. With respect to
personal rights and liberties, these 'social' objectives were brought
into focus by the drafting, accession to, ratification of and the
establishment of enforcement procedures of the international bill of
2 David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an
Illusion 64 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 418 (1996). According to Kennedy the move
from formalism to pragmatism in international law is told as one of progress or
social evolution. This replacement of classical international law is told as "a story
of modernization, of internationalization and of the left." Id. at 387. See David
Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 4 TRANSNAT'L
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 328-75 (1994) (discussing the various waves of renewal
in international law). This theme of renewal and restatement in international law
also developed at length by Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of Empire, Address at
the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (March 24,
1999). For one of the latest waves of liberal renewal in international law, see
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995);
Andrew Tulumello & Stephan Wood, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, AM. J. INT'L
L. (1998); Toward An Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1992);
International Law and International Relations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J.
INT'LL. 205 (1993); Liberal International Relations Law Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 717 (1995). For a critique of
Slaughter's liberal international law, see Outi Korhonen, Liberalism and
International Law: A Center Projecting a Periphery, 65 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 481
(1996). For other critiques of various liberal renewal narratives, see Martii
Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 466
(1966); Susan Marks, The End of History?: Reflections on Some International
Legal Thesis, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L.449,477 (1997). For a third world critique of liberal
renewal in international human rights, see Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of
Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589 (1996).
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rights; as for environmentalism, this was sought to be accomplished
by initiatives calling for moving away from irresponsible, industrial
and pro-development policies. These post-war, pro-active, 'social'
initiatives fall into two readily recognizable streams; the first
emphasizes environmental, social, and economic rights; the second
stresses civil and political rights.
The first stream is concerned with the welfare entitlements or
the basic needs of groups and individuals. It supports the basic needs
approach to economic growth. At first blush, this method appears
similar to the more radical Third World agenda of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO); however, upon closer
inspection, there are marked differences. The basic needs approach
largely stayed clear of the radical claims NIEO agenda. The reason is
due, in part, to the perception, particularly prevalent in the West, that
the NIEO embodies an unacceptable form of international socialism
that would undermine the capitalist foundations of the international
society.
The second stream, which supports civil and political rights,
argues that the concept of sovereignty should not be used as a bar to
international intervention in the domestic affairs of the state,
especially when dictatorial, authoritarian, and genocidal regimes are
abusing the civil and political rights of its people.3 This stream is
3 The civil and political rights stream support interventionary foreign policies
among Western industrial powers and by the United Nations in support of
protection for human rights. They critique dictatorial third world regimes and
scholars of international law who argue that interventionary policies, even in
support of a human rights policies, are inconsistent with the Westaphalian system
of the autonomy of states. Examples of work falling into the civil and political
rights streams include: Louis Henkin, United States and the Crisis in Human
Rights, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1974); See generally HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, (Richard Lillich ed. 1973); See Tom
Farer, On A Collision Course: The American Campaign for Human Rights and the
Antiradical Bias in the Third World, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Donald P.
Kommers & Gilbert D. Loescher eds., 1979); See Thomas Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); The Democratic
Entitlement, 29 UNIv. RICHMOND L. REV. 1 (1994); MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL.,
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 60-65 (1992). Wolfgang
Friedman, The Reality of International Law - A Reappraisal, 10 COLUMBIAN J.
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associated with a liberal internationalist outlook which highlights the
importance of globalizing the legal and moral prerogatives which
correspond to the civil and political guarantees made by the
international bill of human rights.'
In the post-Cold War period, the civil and political rights
category has gained a new ascendancy as Western governments,
scholars, activists and non-governmental groups, along with their
allies in the developing world, have emphatically embraced this
approach. Its adherents argue that traditional conceptions of
sovereignty and related doctrines, such as the norm of non-
interference, are crumbling or have already broken down and given
way to new trans-boundary or universal norms contained in the
international bill of human rights.6 According to this view, states--
TRANSNAT'L L. 46 (1971), did not focus on justifying interventionary policies to
support human rights in other countries. He advocated for the universality of norms
of international law so that it was not only applied against 'other countries,' but
powerful countries such as the United States as well.
4 For a very candid critique of liberal internationalism in international human
rights, see generally, RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
(1981). Falk argues that liberal internationalists who support an activist American
foreign policy on human rights are "unduly innocent about the imperial tendencies
of big, dominant states whatever their rhetoric and their domestic record of
observance." Falk also notes that liberal internationalists give insufficient attention
to "the influence and sorting of the mixed motives in interventionary settings." Id.
at 4.
5 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, A Post-Cold War Human Rights Agenda, 19 YALE J.
INT'L L. 249 (1994). Henkin argues that while when the cold war broke the
international human rights movement was at its infancy. Half a century later with
the end of the cold war, the international human rights agenda was established
beyond challenge. Id.
6 See THoMAs FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995). Franck states that sovereignty "has historically been a factor greatly
overrated in international relations." Id. at 3. Franck buttresses this assertion with
examples of rules of international law that have traditionally imposed restrictions
on government actions, such as those regarding national treatment of aliens and
their property. However, Franck argues that in view of the growing sense of global
community and moderate scarcity of resources in the international context, the need
to rethink 'notions of sovereignty' has never been greater. Id. at 3-12. Franck
supports the democratic control of governments by people through mechanisms
such as elections - However, he fails to address the possibility that loss of
1999
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especially those from sub-Saharan Africa-- no longer have exclusive
control of their territory and population and, as such, they cannot
violate internationally recognized human rights with impunity, lest
they subject themselves to legitimate international censure. Its
advocates argue that the statist conception of international law is only
concerned with relations between states and the view that other states
cannot interfere in the "internal" affairs of other countries is no longer
an acceptable interpretation of this norm in all cases, especially where
gross violations of human rights such as genocide is involved In fact,
they argue that sovereignty is in the process of being dissolved
completely. As a result, the protection of people's freedom and their
human rights is no longer contingent upon the extent to which their
particular state chooses to enforce its laws to protect its citizens.
Rather, it has become the obligation of the entire international
community to be the watchdog for everyone's rights. This 'new'
responsibility follows logically from the recognition that international
law gives to the rights of individuals -- a departure from the era when
international law only recognized the rights of states.7
sovereignty from global processes also simultaneously erodes his desire for popular
control in cases where international institutions have assumed larger and larger
powers that assume decision maling power over issues that popular processes that
he advocates would best be able to have control over in a democracy. See Phillip
R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of
Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1944, 1949 (1997) (reviewing
THOMAS FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
7 See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982). Professor Sohn states
that the:
[M]odem rule of international law concerning human rights are
the result of a silent revolution of the 1940's, a revolution that
was almost unnoticed at the time. Its effects have now spread
around the world, destroying idols to which humanity paid
obeisance for centuries . . States have had to concede that
individuals are no longer mere objects, mere pawns in the hands
of states.
Id. at 1. Similarly, Wolfgang Friedman argues that the "most basic significance of
this new phase is that the human being, singly, in groups, or through the state of his
nationality, has become the direct concern of international law." Friedman, The
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Between the 1950s and 1970s, international law scholars--
especially those from the then, newly independent Asian and African
states-launched another initiative. However, this one went further
than previous efforts to breathe a new sense of social consciousness
into international law-in part by combining both streams of rights
while going beyond them at the same time. This initiative, referred
to as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), comprised a
range of proposals to revise various rules of international law,
especially those relating to international, economic, and trade law. It
was by no means universally accepted by Third World leaders and
scholars because it intersected, in contradictory and yet
complementary ways, with the prior initiatives intended to give
international law a 'new' social character. The NIEO was designed
to restructure the unequal relationships between the developing and
developed countries in specific contexts, such as trade, foreign aid
and foreign investment. Similar to the efforts to infuse a sense of
social character into international law, the NIEO confronted and tried
to change those established principles of international law that were
detrimental to developing countries. However, because the consent
of the developed countries was needed to effectuate these changes,
this could not be accomplished.8
Unable to mobilize the consent or even acquiescence of
developed countries to change these specific doctrines of traditional
or classical international law, the advocates of a NIEO, among others,
settled on an intermediate position. Those who supported the passage
of new, legally binding principles, such as those contained in the
NIEO's Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States ("the
Charter"), settled for the recognition of their new proposals as
declaratory statements or principles rather than as laws. In
international discourse, these declaratory statements or principles,
Reality ofInternational Law, supra note 1, at 10.
' "[Tiraditional international law has helped to make independence a completely
superficial phenomenon, beneath the surface of which old forms of domination
survive and the economic empires of the multinational corporations, and the
powers that protect them, prosper." MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TowARDs A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 81 (1979).
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often referred to as 'soft' law (as opposed to 'hard' law) are non-
binding on states and individuals because they do not contain any
positive, legal obligations or assertions. Nevertheless, they are still
of significant value because they put political pressure on
governments, their people, and international institutions, often
inspiring and guiding them to act in accordance with these 'soft'
principles or laws. However, the characterization of the NIEO as soft
law diminished its re-distributive ability at the international level.
Several reasons have been advanced to explain why the NIEO
became soft law rather than hard law. These reasons also explain
why the redistributive potential of the NIEO was diminished. First,
the Program of Action on the Establishment of the NIEO, unlike the
Charter, was not voted upon by the United Nations General Assembly
("U.N.G.A."). 9 Since U.N.G.A. resolutions were disputed as sources
of international law to begin with, critics argued that the Program of
Action ("the Program") was a fortiori, a questionable source of
international law, because there was not even a vote on it. Second, the
United States Ambassador to the U.N. argued that, without a vote, the
Program represented the views of only 'one faction' of the U.N.G.A..
Therefore, those views had not obtained international consensus.
10
Third, the efficacy of the Program was questioned by several
Western countries which expressed their disagreement by entering
several reservations to it.1 Fourth, it was argued that although the
Charter was intended to establish norms for obtaining a just and
equitable international economic order, there was no legal authority
for its notion of collective economic security for development or its
international re-distributive proposals. In addition, developed
countries argued that the Charter established a double standard by
giving systematic preferences in favor of developing countries at the
expense of developed countries. The result was a separate legal
9 Jonathan Dubitzky, Recent Developments: The General Assembly's
International Economics 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 670, 671 (1975).
'0 13 I.L.M. 745 (1974). Japan welcomed the declaration on the New
International Economic Order. See id.
" See id. at 744-766. Those countries that entered reservations included the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and West Germany. See id.
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regime under which developed countries would not benefit from the
same rights and privileges enjoyed by developing countries in their
relations with other developed countries.12  Fifth, the Charter
attempted to establish norms that are inconsistent with prevailing
international legal norms. For example, the Charter proposed that
nationalization, expropriation, and transfer of foreign property were
rights held by the state and as such, controversies would be settled by
the law of the nationalizing state. The prevailing international norm
requires that when foreign property is nationalized, full and prompt
compensation must be made. The Charter's proposal for restitution
and compensation for damages to territories and injury to people
affected by colonialism and apartheid was also opposed to as inimical
to prevailing international law. Sixth, it has been argued that even
though the Charter was approved by a majority of the members of the
U.N.G.A., it was opposed by many important and powerful countries,
such as the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg
and the United Kingdom. 3
Because the NIEO was considered to be soft law, it
established qualified rather than binding norms, with a sufficient
normative character capable of generating specific legal effects.
Similarly, it has been argued that the international bill of human
rights and various environmental treaties have gone beyond the
conceptual confines of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention
in furthering political liberty on the one hand, and social and
economic objectives on the other. These objectives go well beyond
the traditional conception of international law as securing peace.
The efficacy of the international bill of rights and in
environmental treaties can be found in the defacto manner in which
they have enhanced human rights and environmental protection as
part of shared inter-governmental commitments. Consequently,
advocacy for these soft norms is aimed at establishing principles to
12 Developed countries argued that these proposals were inconsistent with the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff's non-discriminatory principle as
embodied in Article 1, See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
Art.1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948).
13 See Dubitzky, supra note 9, at 673-674.
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inspire and guide governmental and public action. Moreover, groups
and individuals who create political pressure that draws attention to
human rights abuses or environmental protection are empowered by
these soft norms. In addition, advocates of these soft norms argue
that they constitute declaratory statements of a universal nature which
serve the important purpose of educating and informing people
around the world about the importance of safeguarding human rights
and environmental protection.
One factor that distinguishes the NIEO from other soft law
norms -- such as human rights and environmentalism -- is the
overriding presumption in international legal opinion that the NIEO
violates the very character of international economic relations. Its
proposals seek to undermine the implicit assumption that the
economic sphere is self-regulating and should therefore not be subject
to regulatory intervention. Consequently, although the various
proposals of the NIEO are often referred to as soft norms of
international law, they have attracted opposition from Western
governments, while other soft law norms, such as the international
bill of human rights and international guarantees of environmental
protection, have attracted the hostility of Third World governments.
A. Giving International Law a Social Character: From Basic
Needs to Good Governance
Although traditional conceptions of sovereignty and statism
are said to be eroding, they are still defended by international
financial institutions ("IFI") such as the World Bank ("the Bank").
The Bank bases its position on its constituent instrument, the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
Articles of Agreement, to support the view that human rights are a
political issue which fall outside the Bank's mandate unless it can be
defined in a technical or functional mode, to fit within the economic
and financial goals of the Bank. This means that the Bank, as well as
human rights supporters working within and outside the Bank, must
reconcile human rights initiatives with the Bank's economic and
financial goals. Because human rights activists have been left with
little choice other than to reconcile their agenda with the economic
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and financial mandate of the Bank, this has resulted in "sullying"
their otherwise idealistic positions, and in this sense they have lost
some of their credibility as an independent critic of the Bank and its
development policies.
While this new approach is praised for abandoning a hostile
or uncompromising opposition to international economic policy,
unfortunately, it abandons previous approaches which permitted
citizens and groups to demand welfare concerns be defined in terms
of basic needs and rights from the state and institutions of
development. In short, the requirement that the human rights agenda
within the Bank must be consistent with the financial and economic
mandate severely constrains the Bank's initiatives in the arena of
human rights. It has also resulted in limiting the efficacy of
opposition to the Bank's financial and economic mandate in so far as
the execution of this mandate is inconsistent with guarantees of
human rights.
This, I argue, reflects the conservative nature of the good
governance agenda, very much like the 'soft' or declaratory law
approach developed in the 1970s was used to defeat proposals to
reformulate international politics, economics, and society. It is
conservative to the extent that it is based on establishing links
between human rights and development policies of the World Bank
that may themselves be inimical to the protection of social and
economic rights in particular. By emphasizing the mutually
reinforcing character of human rights and economic policy, assuming
they are always supportive of each other, human rights activists have
found a foothold to negotiate with the Bank. In my view, this has
only served to legitimize the economically disastrous programs of
neo-liberal economic reform embraced by the World Bank.
The good governance agenda recasts the neo-liberal economic
policies of the World Bank in the guise of a new lingo compatible
with, rather than opposed to, human rights. This conception gives
preference to economic policy over human rights, unless these rights
can be conceptualized within this economic logic, such as openness
in international trade, finance, commerce, and reduced social
spending in education and health, for example. The World Bank has,
therefore, tended to support only those rights that fit within its
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ascendant laissez-faire commitments. Ultimately then, it is civil and
political rights--those most compatible with neo-liberal economic
reform, such as private property and freedom of contract -- that have
received the most support in the good governance agenda.
This article addresses the manner in which the good governance
agenda has emerged as a counter-insurgency discourse to reformist
projects such as the NIEO and those intended to give international
law a 'social character.' The good governance agenda is a careful
integration of human rights and growth-driven economic policy, not
as incompatible projects but as a necessary alliance for democratic
and economic reform. This approach involves justifying rights within
a laissez-faire economic and political framework. I stress that by
emphasizing the compatibility between human rights and laissez-faire
economic policy, the good governance agenda underplays the
constraints neo-liberal economic policy imposes on the realization of
social and economic rights (or welfare entitlements/basic needs) in
particular, and third generation rights associated with the NIEO, such
as the right to development. Inasmuch as human rights are an
instrumental component of the good governance agenda, the focus on
rights, such as protection of private property, enforcement of
contracts, and a minimalist notion of the universal franchise, limits its
potential to address the systemic inequalities, social division, and
hierarchy in national and international society.
B. The 'Basic Needs' Critique of Development as Economic
Growth
The basic needs critique arose as an approach to development
in the late 1960s and early 1970s to criticize the dominant paradigm
of development adopted at that time in developing countries by post
colonial governments with the support of international financial
institutions. This dominant paradigm defined development primarily
in terms of economic growth and focused on increasing per capita
output, specifically in industrial production. This goal was consistent
with the theme of modernization embraced by post-colonial
governments in the Third World generally, and in sub-Saharan Africa
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in particular. 4 In Kenya for example, this goal of pursuing economic
growth was stated in a government blueprint as follows :
The most important [policy] is to provide a firm basis
for rapid economic growth. Other immediate
problems such as Africanization of the economy,
education, unemployment and welfare services and
provincial policies must be handled in ways that do
not jeopardize growth... Growth then is the first
concern of planning in Kenya. 5
Critiques of the "development as growth" paradigm pointed
out that, because its primary emphasis was increasing per capita
income, it downplayed or ignored the provision of basic needs such
as formal education, public health, utilities, and other similar social
amenities. In market oriented countries like Kenya, which had
adopted an official policy of African Socialism in its development
planning, critics referred to the incongruity of its development as
growth economic program with its declared official policy on African
14 Modernization was also thought of as a process of institutionalizing "other
forms of institutional and structural change such as 'state building' (i.e. the
expansion of state power conjointly with the introduction of parliamentary and
democratic institutions), and the inculcation of a particular set of development-
enhancing 'modem' (i.e. Western') values and habits of among the people of
traditional societies." Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics of Knowledge:
A Critical Interpretation of the Social Role of Modernization Theories in the
Development of the Third World, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 29 (Frederique &
Stephen Marglin eds., 1990).
'" GOVERNMENT OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO
PLANNING IN KENYA 18 (1965). Kenya then, unlike Tanzania which adopted a
socialist route to development under Nyerere, was regarded either as dependent
economy in the international capitalist system with a class of local comprador
bourgeoisie or as an example of a vibrant indigenous entrepreneurial class leading
a periphery economy into capitalist development contrary to the predictions of
dependency and neo-Marxist theorists. For a review of this debate, see Colin Leys,
Learning From the Kenya Debate, in DAVID D. APTER & CARL G. ROSBERG,
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THENEW REALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 220-
243 (1994). On Tanzania's alternative route see generally POLITICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN KENYA AND TANZANIA (Joel D. Barkan, ed., 1984).
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Socialism which underscored that traditional African cultures
provided a ready foundation for socialism, especially in the provision
of subsidized public services such as education and health.
16
The basic needs approach arose as a critique of the paradigm
of development as economic growth. International organizations,
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United
Nations Development Program and the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF), sponsored research projects to buttress the critiques
of the development as growth model.' 7 Debates on international
human rights within various United Nations bodies and within the
scholarly community provided an additional impetus for
popularization of the basic needs strategy as discussed below. These
bodies argued that the paradigm of development as growth was in
crisis for a variety of reasons. 8
16 Countries such as Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ghana under
Nkuruma, Guinea under Sekou Toure and Tanzania under Nyerere initially adopted
a philosophy of African socialism that presumed traditional African societies would
accommodate socialism 'naturally' without conflict or tension, only to revise this
approach and adopt variations of scientific socialism (such as Leninist Marxism)
as experience proved them wrong. See SOCIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A
NEW ASSESSMENT (Carl G. Rosberg & Thomas M. Callaghy eds., 1979).
17 See, e.g., UNICEF, A STRATEGY FOR BASIC SERVICES (1975). The
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD also endorsed the basic needs
strategy, OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION EFFORTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE COMMITTEES (1977). See LAWRENCE BLOOMBERG & CHARLES
ABRAMS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO KENYA ON HOUSING
(1965); See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT, INCOME AND
INEQUALITY : A STRATEGY FOR INCREASING PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA
(1972). Tanzania, which followed a socialist route to development under Nyerere
was not spared the scrutiny of the ILO, see INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, BASIC
NEEDS IN DANGER: A BASIC NEEDS ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR
TANZANIA (1982).
,8 According to Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A
Critical Interpretation of the Social Role of Modernization Theories in the
Development of the Third World, in FREDERIQUE & STEPHEN MAROLIN,
DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE (1990). This crisis or disillusionment with development
defined in terms of economic growth arose as a result of:
[T]he extremely uneven record of development: of the
persistence of poverty amid increasing affluence, of the increase
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Studies performed in Kenya and elsewhere by the ILO in the
early 1970's illustrated that although growth driven development had
created new wealth, this wealth was not trickling down as intended. 9
It was also associated with absolute and relative decline in average
in unemployment despite increasing production, and in general,
of the failure to ameliorate the condition of people in the poorest
countries of Africa and Asia. A second reason is the increasing
association of modernization and development with ecological
disasters: the devastation of tropical rain forests and mountain
watersheds, the deleterious (and unanticipated) ecological
consequences of large dams and large irrigation schemes, the
loss of subsistence agricultural land to desertification in Africa
and to water logging and vulnerability of modem technologies.
Another contributory factor is a similarly increasing association
of development with higher levels of conflict and tension in
much of the third world, in almost all parts where the
development of project has been under way for a significant
period of time, where such conflicts as wars, civil unrest, civic
and ethnic violence, political repression, and urban crime appear
to have increased tremendously. Responsibility must also be
placed at the door of a fourth consideration, namely the onset of
period of confusion, muddled groping, and search for new
paradigms in economics as well as political science, the two
mother disciplines of development theory.
Id. at 30-31.
19 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT, INCOMES, AND EQUALITY: A
STRATEGY OF INCREASING PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA (1972);
EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS (1976). The ILO's approach to basic
needs acknowledged the need for both domestic and international action for its
alleviation. See id. Its World Employment Program of 1969 expanded its specific
focus on employment to include "a concern for the creation of more egalitarian
societies via the provision of productive employment for all ... [which would]
require structural transformation of national and transnational economic relations
in order to incorporate unorganized and marginal citizens into remunerative
activities." RICHARD SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF BASIC NEEDS: URBAN ASPECTS
OF ASSAULTING POVERTY 9 (1982). See generally, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS: A ONE WORLD PROBLEM: THE
INTERNATIONAL "BASIC-NEEDS STRATEGY" AGAINST CHRONIC POVERTY (1976);
See also WORLD BANK, KENYA: INTO THE SECOND DECADE (Judith Heyer et al,
eds., 1975); see also AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT (1976).
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incomes, 20 and an increase in economic dependence on European and
North American technology and markets. Similar studies in countries
as diverse as Brazil and the Ivory Coast also showed that
development as growth was associated with an increase in gross
domestic product and in the levels of poverty and inequality.2
Some scholars have argued that those studies supporting a
basic needs approach failed to acknowledge the contradictory nature
of the development of productive forces in a capitalist setting. In
other words, the development of productive forces invariably takes
place at an enormous social cost. For example, while the ILO had
recommended the extension of the small holder production strategy
in Central Kenya to fight unemployment and other measures to
accelerate the break up of underutilized large farms, these scholars
argued that the ILO's recommendations overstated the considerable
human suffering, inequality and social dislocation that accompanied
these developments while ignoring the fact that these shortcomings
occurred simultaneously and were thus inseparable from an increased
economic growth which significantly contributed to satisfying social
needs in central Kenya.22
20 FRANCES STEWART, PLANNING TO MEET BASIC NEEDS 10 (1985). For a debate
on the importance of basic needs in the Kenyan context, see Colin Leys,
Development Strategy in Kenya Since 1971, 13.5 CAN. J. AFR. STUDIES 295, 295-
320 (1979); M. Godfrey, Prospects for a Basic Needs in Kenya, 9 IDS BULLETIN
4 (1978); Martin Godfrey et al., PLANNING FOR BASIC NEEDS IN KENYA:
PERFORMANCE, POLICIES AND PROSPECTS (1979); see also Lionel Cliffe,
Underdevelopment or Socialism? A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Tanzania,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA (Richard Harris ed., 1975); see also
GERALD HOLTHAM & ARTHUR HAZELWOOD, AID AND INEQUALITY IN KENYA:
BRITISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO KENYA (1976).
21 BEN WISNER, POWER AND NEED IN AFRICA: BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 31 (1988).
22 Michael Chege, The Political Economy of.Agrarian Change in Central Kenya,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA 93,96 (Michael G. Schatzberg ed., 1987).
According to Chege, "the corrosive aspect of populist development strategies - and
'dependency' and 'basic needs,' and allied doctrines are populist - lies in their
moralistic conceptualization of development, eschewing secular and rational
paradigms of market or Marxian variety. This, in turn, arrests the forces of
production, ironically hurting the poor in the process .... ." Id. at 115. The
contradictory character of capitalism in the African context was invoked in the
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The basic needs critique became assimilated within the
debates on economic development notwithstanding its shortcoming
in failing to acknowledge the contradictory nature of capitalist
development. Its almost exclusive focus on the distributive
implications and the social suffering of development as growth, failed
to acknowledge the positive impacts of capitalist development/or the
development of productive forces. In addition, the basic needs
approach may be regarded as an attempt to salvage the promises of
modernization or the myth of development.23 This must be the case
considering some of the most vocal criticisms of the development
paradigm and its accompanying justificatory regime of
modernization. According to Tariq Banuri, the single most important
reason for disillusionment with development was not so much its
negative social and political impact, but rather the "erosion of the
mid-1970's particularly by Bill Warren to discredit dependency and other accounts
of development that were skeptical of the possibility of capitalist development in
the periphery. See Bill Warren, Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization, NEW
LEFT REv. 3-44 (1973). For a further critique of redistribution and socialism as an
economic development agenda as promoted by groups such as the ILO in the
1970's, see Michael Chege, Swapping Development Strategies, supra note, at 280-
283. According to Chege, this concern with redistribution, especially in Kenya was
an uncritical intellectual effort intended to "fan the political flames than illuminate
social realities." He cites studies to support the proposition that contrary to the
unsubstantiated claims of the ILO and like-minded intellectuals that there were
widespread falls in incomes in rural areas in Kenya and Tanzania, there in fact
increases in general welfare until intervening economic downturns changed these
realities. See also Arthur Hazelwood, Kenya : Income Distribution and Poverty -
an Unfashionable View, 16 L MOD. AFR. STUD. 81-95 (1978). Hazelwood argues
that the basic needs debate put too much emphasis on inequality and less attention
to absolute levels of living. Id.
23 Tariq Banuri makes this argument with respect to initiatives other than basic
needs which were developed as alternatives to development as economic growth.
Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A Critical
Interpretation of the Social Role ofModernization Theories in the Development of
the Third World, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE (Frederique & Stephen Marglin,
eds., 1990). ld. at 51. On political development see also id. chapter 5.
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myth that development can create a just and human society., 24 This
debate is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
C. Weak and Strong Versions of the Basic Needs Critique
In the remainder of this section, I will focus on two versions
of the basic needs critique: one, weak and the other, strong. In each,
the critique argues for a prioritization of the essential needs of the
world's poor in development through initiatives such as social
insurance against the vagaries of the market through social welfare
and publicly funded education, health, and housing. The basic needs
approach is also associated with the importance it places on the
satisfaction of basic needs such as clothing and nutrition, especially
among the poor and economically vulnerable persons within the
development process. At the outset, it is significant to point out that
the basic needs approach to redistributive justice differs from that
embraced within liberal theories of justice. Liberal theories of
justice, unlike the basic needs approaches, are mainly concerned with
the way in which societal institutions determine the division of
benefits and burdens in society.25 By contrast, basic needs approaches
are primarily concerned with the sensitivity of the development
policy embraced by a government to the needs of the poor, vulnerable
and poverty stricken.
The weak version of the basic needs approach attracted the
attention of capitalist oriented countries as well as international
24 Id. at 31. According to Banuri, the erosion of the myth of development "also
permitted the increase and self assurance of non-Western (and often anti-Western)
social, cultural, and political movements in Third World countries." Id.
25 One of the leading statements of this liberal view is JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971). For a critique of the nature of the state (one that is neutral
among competing conceptions of the good, while maximizing the capacity of
groups to maximize their chosen ends) proposed by this liberal vision, see
Liberalism and Its Critics (Michael Sandel ed., 1984); see also STEPHEN MULHALL
& ADAM SwIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS (1996).
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financial institutions for a variety of reasons.26 First, it represented a
means of addressing emerging social movements and unrest in
developing countries during the 1950-1960 period, the high point of
the 'development as growth' strategy. These movements not only
questioned the limits of the 'development as growth' approach, but
have been thought of as challenges to "the very concepts of the
centralized, impersonal, and bureaucratically organized nation
state."27 Both versions of the basic needs approach cushioned popular
challenges both to the capitalist state and also to capitalist
development by providing prospects for social amenities that the
growth oriented development model overlooked. Secondly, a weak
approach to basic needs was consistent with the contradictory nature
of capitalist development, which requires the provision of welfare
entitlements as a "means of exercising social control over the
working class and subsidizing capital's profit making."28 The
contradictory nature of the welfare state is embodied in its
simultaneous tendency to provide for basic needs such as housing,
food and health through regulation of their provision or through
taxation or social security systems, 29 while at the same time
26 For the variety of reasons that led to adoption of basic needs as part of
American foreign development assistance policy, see Rolf H. Sartorius & Vernon
W. Ruttan, The Sources of the Basic Needs Mandate, 23 J. OF DEvELOPING AREAS
331-362 (1989).
27 Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics ofKnowledge, supra note 24, at 51.
2 CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE? THE NEV POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF WELFARE 57 (1991).
29 Some scholars have argued that although in the short run inequality helps to
maintain political stability through extraction of rents from the disorganized rural
poor to buy of the organized urban labor force, in the long run it militates against
"labor intensive and efficient development paths." MICHAEL LIPTON, WHY POOR
PEOPLE STAY POOR: URBAN BIAS IN WORLD DEvELOPMENT 42-43 (1977); See
generally, ROBERT BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL AFRICA (1983).
Bates questions the presumption that "urban and industrial areas were determining
the fundamental character of the African continent." Id. at 1.
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displaying tendencies "to repress and control people, to adopt them
to the requirements of the capitalist economy."3
In the strong version, the basic needs approach criticized
development as growth for failing to question national mal-
distribution of wealth, power, and resources.3 In addition to
questioning the class structure in national economies, the strong
version of the basic needs approach requires "a reorientation of the
productive system away from the provision of non-essential goods for
a small, high income category, and towards the satisfaction of the
basic needs of the low income category., 32 In a study of Kenya in the
early 1970s, the ILO concluded that only far reaching changes such
as land reform and economic distribution would suffice to address
poverty and provide jobs to the huge unemployed workforce. These
reforms are considered prerequisites for enabling the poor to have
control of their own development needs.33 They call for self-reliant
and self-governing forms of development which are transformative
and thus do not take for granted the hierarchies in the sphere of
production and reproduction. They seek to challenge the market as
well as the social relations which promote hierarchy and division as
a means of enabling all people to realize their needs freely. In
general, they challenge the view embodied in development as
economic growth--that if an economy is growing, wealth will
automatically trickle down to the poor.
In contrast, the weak version of the basic needs approach
embraces a view of development that takes for granted the existing
30 CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE? THE NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF WELFARE 57 (1991), quoting GOUGH I., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WELFARE STATE 12 (1979).
3' See SANDBROOK, supra note 20. He advocates a radical (as opposed to
conservative) approach to basic needs that "would prescribe for a mutually
reinforcing set of policies entailing structural change at the national and
international levels." Id. at 7.
32 Id. at 229.
33 ILO, Follow-up of the World Employment Conference: Basic Needs,
International Labor Conference, 65" Session. Report 7, Geneva, 1979 notes that the
participation of rural populations in the development process is important to enable
them to safeguard their interests, at 59.
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distribution of wealth, power and resources. It focuses on meeting
basic needs-mainly for survival and minimum income.34 The poor
tend to be seen as helpless and disconnected from the underlying
structures of wealth and power distribution. While it is doubtful that
any fundamental changes took place at the World Bank as a result of
the critique of development as economic growth, McNamara's tenure
as President of the Bank (1968 - 1981) best exemplifies the attempt
to institutionalize basic needs as part of the Bank's lending
portfolio.35 Its attraction for the Bank was the fact that, unlike in the
strong version, in the weak version, basic needs did not question the
existing distribution of wealth, power, and resources in society in
ways that would require market intervention.36 This view presumes
34 See Reginald Green, Basic Human Needs: Concept or Slogan, Synthesis or
Smokescreen?, 9 IDS Bull. 10 (1978).
35 See ROBERTL. AYRES, BANKING ON THE POOR: THEWORLD BANKANDWORLD
POvERTY (1983). However, Teresa Hayter and Catherine Watson doubt that the
Bank changed significantly under McNamara. TERESA HAYTER & CATHERINE
WATSON, AD: RHETORIC AND REALITY (1985). They note that the "concern in the
Bank's 'policy dialogue' about the effects of government policies on poverty is, as
it was in the 1960's, and as it is in the programmes of the IMF, an afterthought,
something that should be attended to in the future, after the government has dealt
with the more immediate problems of debt, deficits and inflation." Id. at 98. See
also id. at 227-236.
36 RICHARD SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF BASIC NEEDS, supra note 20.
Sandbrook reminds us that the World Bank is not monolithic and there are in fact
employees of the Bank who subscribed to the strong version of the basic needs
approach. He notes, however, that it is the views of President Robert McNamara
at the Bank which defined the Bink's approach. Sandbrook is critical of the
McNamara approach since it regards poverty as arising largely "from factors
internal to each developing country, and that its eradication therefore largely
depends upon governmental policies and actions directed towards those internal
barriers to development. Moreover, the Bank's propensity for developing and
prescribing policy on a sectoral basis (rural, urban, education, health and so on)
lends itself to a conception of poverty amelioration as isolated, piecemeal reforms.
Particular policy reforms and projects are designed to assist 'target groups' among
the poor to escape absolute depravation; but an unreformed modem business sector
will continue business as usual." Id. at 7-8. For a critique of the World Bank's
social safety net programs initiated in the era of SAPS starting in the mid-1980s
another program justified as part of the basic needs policy, see WISNER, supra note
21, at 130-147.
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that the economic sphere ought to be self-regulating and therefore
beyond regulatory intervention by the state in favor of distribution
short of a complete break with a market economy. As such, as
conceived by the World Bank, the weak version of basic needs posed
no challenge to the growth as development model that was the subject
of the basic needs critique in the first place. The weak version of
basic needs in essence separated the pursuit of equality which was the
goal of the strong version, from its goal of meeting basic needs such
as those of food, nutrition and education.
The Bank's weakened version of the basic needs approach
was in part embodied in the concept of redistribution with growth.37
Redistribution with growth was promoted as an alternative
development strategy to development as economic growth, since the
latter did not incorporate distributional goals as part of its agenda.
This weakened version of basic needs proceeded from an
acknowledgment that "the distribution of income and the creation of
employment opportunities would not be approached separately from
the achievement of economic growth."38 According to the World
Bank, in societies with very low standards of living, meeting basic
37 See generally HOLLIS B. CHENERY ET AL., REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH
(1974); HOLLIS CHENERY, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY
(1979). See also Gavin Williams, The World Bank and the Peasant Problem, in
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA (Robert Heyer and Gavin Williams
eds., 1981). Other discussions of redistribution with growth include: EMPLOYMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (E.O. Edwards, ed., 1974); see also THIRD WORLD
EMPLOYMENT (Richard Jolly et al., eds., 1973).
3 Tony Killick, Trends in Development Economics and Their Relevance to Africa,
18 J. of Mod. Afr. Stud. 373 (1989). For statements in support of the proposition
that employment and distribution of income should be pursued as part and parcel
of development policy, see MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMICS FOR A DEVELOPING
WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT 98 (1977); MEASURING DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF AND
ADEQUACY OFDEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (Nancy Baster ed., 1972); Dudley Seers,
WhatAre We Trying Measure, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY: FOUR CRITICAL STUDIES
(David Lehmann ed., 1979). For my assessment of how structural adjustment
reform has resulted in disabling governmental involvement in furthering
distributive goals, see James Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence To Neo-Liberalism THIRD WORLD
LEG. STUD. (1999).
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needs was more equitable, moral and important than reducing
inequality, which was considered to be of secondary concern to poor
people. Moreover, from an operational standpoint, the Bank had a
difficult time dealing with the issue of inequality, especially because
its definition was complex and abstract.39
In addition, the World Bank's concept of participation (as set
forth in its 1990 World Development Report), is limited to voluntary
enrollment in Bank projects and services, and issues such as cost
effectiveness or productivity and investment,40 rather than the myriad
ways in which people can actively transform their dependent status.
According to the report, poverty alleviation involves encouraging
broad based economic growth that takes advantage of the lower
class's abundant labor resources. Easing indigence is also associated
with "the provision of goods and services that may or may not
alleviate the very poverty that conventional development funding
provokes."''
D. Functionalism and the Basic Needs Approach in
International Law
Another reason why international institutions, such as the
World Bank, became interested in the basic needs model was because
of its grounding in the functionalist theories of international
cooperation that were adopted in the post- Second World War period.
David Mitrany, for example, argued that the role of international
institutions was the provision of services rather than the enumeration
of states' rights. In his view, such functionalism would in turn secure
international peace; though people may applaud and idealize the
declarations of rights, they cared more about the reality of having
food on their table. The satisfaction of these basic needs was a call
39 P. STREETEN ET AL. FIRST THINGS FIRST: MEETING BASIC NEEDS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17 (1981).
40 S. Horton & T. King, Labor Productivity: Un Tour d'Horizon, World Bank
Staff Working Paper No.497, Washington D.C. (1981).
4' WISNER, POWER AND AID IN AFRICA, supra note 21, at 41. WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1990).
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for action that had to be turned into an 'historic opportunity.' This
also involved transforming the role of international agencies from the
esoteric function of elaborating juridical rules to the more essential
function of meeting those demands or needs.42 For example, as an
acknowledgment of their role in meeting the fundamental demands
of the hungry, the sick, and the homeless, the ILO and specialized
U.N. agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Culture Organization
(UNESCO) actively participated in the drafting process of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.43
Other functionalist thinkers at the time argued that classical
international law had broken down because it had lost touch with the
dynamics of the real world; and further, that it was mired in the age-
old formalistic concept that international society was composed of
individual states governed by self-interest and controlled by
international rules that were imposed and enforced upon them.
International law, they recommended, could only develop on a
functional basis by coordinating goals that are evident not just to the
individual states but to all individuals.44 Such functionalist thinking
42 DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (1943). Mitrany argued that the
League of Nations, the UN charter, proposals for world or regional federation and
for an enforced peace as in the tradition of the 18"' century were out of favor and
harmony with our time whose "trend is to organize government along the lines of
specific ends and needs...in lieu of the traditional organization on the basis of a set
of constitutional division of jurisdiction of rights and powers so that the rise of
specific administrative agencies and laws is the peculiar trait and indeed foundation
of modem government." Id. at 7, 20-21.
41 Philip Alston, Making or Breaking Human Rights: The UN's Specialized
Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPERS, No.
1, ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 4-5 (1979).
44 GERHART NIEMEYER, LAW WITHOUT FORCE (1941). According to Niemeyer,
society was not made up of individuals, but rather by the connectiveness in their
behavior. The role of law in this context was thus to accomplish the ends desired
by those being governed. At international level, he argued that it was not world
charters but rather administrative agencies that are responsive to the needs of social
security, food rationing, public utility regulation, fair employment practice
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was prevalent not only within the basic needs approach, but also
among international lawyers and organizations, such as C. Wilfred
Jenks, Inis Claude, and E. B. Haas, who were among the leading
functionalist thinkers of the time whose work sought to link basic
needs and human rights.4' However, these scholars rarely, if ever,
addressed the colonial legacies or the ethnocentric assumptions of
international institutions, politics, and law. Unlike discussions of
functionalism, and indeed of international law and politics, which fail
to take into account these issues of power, hierarchy, history, and
identity, which this article does in a small way.4 6
E. Linking Human Rights and Basic Needs - Rights As an
Integral Part of Development
In the 1970s, international human rights lawyers sought to
ground the basic needs approach within the framework of rights as
opposed to needs. In effect, they sought to substitute rights for needs
and as such transform the basic needs doctrine from an apolitical
concept into a legal entitlement. In the words of one international
human rights scholar at the time, to "assert that a particular social
claim is a human right is to invest it emotionally and morally with an
especially high degree order of legitimacy. ' '47
Human rights activists also argued that while meeting welfare
needs of citizens through beneficial or remedial programs was
commissions, public health authorities that were necessary to meet these demands.
45 C. Wilfred Jenks, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights Come to
Life, in RECUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A PAUL
GUGGENHEIM 68 (1968); THE WORLD BEYOND THE CHARTER (1969); E.B. HAAS,
BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (1964); INIS CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES (4
th ed., 1984)
argues that international organizations are functional responses "to the complexities
of the modem state system rather than an optional experiment fastened upon it."
Id. at6.
46 For my own reflections on these questions, see James Gathii, International Law
and Eurocentricity: A Review Essay, 9 EUR. J. OF INT'L LAW 184-211 (1998).
47 Richard Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions,
1 Wis. L. Rev. 174 (1969).
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important, "policies and programs that were based on a perception of
need and powerlessness, reinforced the powerlessness of the
recipients who are being given justice rather than as receiving their
rights. Recognition of entitlement is itself an act of empowerment,"
these activists argued.48
A central feature of international human rights advocacy at the
time was therefore aimed at demonstrating that "respect for human
rights must be an integral part of the development process and that
economic, social and political factors cannot be treated in isolation. '
In furtherance of this position, it was advanced that these human
rights would best be realized if linked to the basic needs development
strategy. This involved campaigning for the recognition that the
delivery of donor agency and multilateral development bank
assistance programs could affect the realization of human rights in
developing countries. It also challenged the widely accepted belief
that human rights and economic development were two separate or
distinct spheres, and that the scope of development was restricted to
economic growth. On the contrary, development now had to be
recast in order to be accommodated within the prevailing notions of
4' HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, INC.,' THE RIGHTS WAY TO
DEVELOPMENT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 30
(1995). The power of this argument has also been emphasized in the context of the
African American minority struggle against White supremacy in the United States.
According to Patricia J. Williams, Aichemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From
Reconstructed Rights 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (1987) the critical legal studies
(CLS) disutility for rights was an inappropriate strategy for minorities like African
Americans to adopt. Williams notes that the CLS disutility for rights arose from the
view that rights "may keep one at a permanent distance from situations which could
profit from closeness and informality," (which for example requires an
abandonment of 'rights to shelter for the homeless into arguments about the 'needs'
for the homeless'). 1d. at 412. One CLS example advocating the political disutility
of rights claims is Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363
(1964). He argues that "people need food and shelter now, and demanding that
those needs be satisfied strikes me as more likely to succeed than claiming that
existing rights to food and shelter must be enforced." Id. at 1394.
49 Philip Alston, Human Rights and the Basic Needs Strategy for Development
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPERS, No. 2, ANTI-SLAVERY
SOCIETY 1 (1979).
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development which gave priority to potentially contradictory
objectives such as increased productivity, growth and profits.
In short, international human rights advocates may be said to
have adopted the slogan that human rights must be an integral part
of the development process; and they adopted the position that the
basic needs development strategy pursued by the World Bank, insofar
as it failed to incorporate human rights, was woefully inadequate. In
support of their arguments, these activists argued that the
incorporation of social and economic rights into the international bill
of human rights supported their case for the recognition of social and
economic needs as rights.50
This 1970s approach that sought to integrate basic needs with
rights in international human rights advocacy differs markedly from
the approach found in the 1990s good governance agenda, which
holds that human rights is only 'relevant' to the extent that it
enhances economic growth. As will be discussed below, good
governance focuses more on civil and political rights rather than
economic and social rights.
Within the basic needs framework, international human rights
advocates focused on expanding the meaning of development to
include human rights, i.e., to get it on the development agenda, just
as basic needs had become part of the development agenda.
Accomplishing this objective would involve elevating a specific goal
into a human right "above the rank and file of competing.., goals,
[which would in turn give] it a degree of immunity from challenge
and generally endow it, with an aura of timelessness, absoluteness
and universal validity."51
By arguing for a linkage between human rights and
development, these activists challenged the functional separation of
the work of international financial institutions from that of the
SO This recognition is embodied in The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res 220 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
"' Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to
Development, in 1 HARV. HuM. RTS. Y.B. 3, 18 (1988).
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political organs of the U.N., the latter, focusing on economic and
financial issues to the exclusion of human rights, which was the
mandate of the former.5 2 Human rights advocates rejected this
separation or sharp distinction between the functions of the political
organs of the U.N. and the economic and financial functions of the
Bretton Woods institutions. They claimed that within the U.N., there
was no aspect of the market (economic and financial) that could exist
separately from other organs of the U.N. which had explicit political
roles including the protection of international human rights. The
drafting, accession, ratification and subsequent initiatives
implementing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)53 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1976 gave further impetus
to those who advocated the incorporation of human rights into
economic development. In addition, the constitutional documents of
the ILO, UNESCO and WHO specifically included human rights as
part of their mandate.14 This process of incorporation was considered
significant in translating the Covenants into 'living instruments.'
55
Moreover, human rights advocates argued that the basic needs
development strategy was very closely related to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations, namely in:
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to
race, sex, language, or religion;
56
52 Id. See also Philip Alston, Making and Breaking Human Rights, supra note 51.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International
Law of the IMF and Human Rights, B. U. INT'L L. J. 81 (1993) (repudiating the
distinction between human rights and the IMF's mandate as artificial).
51 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GOAR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
54 Philip Alston, Making or Breaking Human Rights, supra note 51, at 14-16.
5 Philip Alston, Human Rights and the Basic Needs Strategy, supra note 49, at
8-9. See also Philip Alston, Making or Breaking Human Rights, supra note 51.
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
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promoting international cooperation in the economic, social
cultural, educational and health fields, and assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;57
promoting 'conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations between nations'
which includes 'universal respect for, and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.'58
In addition to the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),59 the ICCPR, and the ICESCR provided additional
international legal basis for the specialized international agencies
involved in development to argue for the incorporation of human
rights into their activities.
The process of drafting, national accession to, and
enforcement of the norms of international human rights law within
the United Nations framework since 1945 has been thought of as a
major development in international cooperation on an issue which,
under classical international law, belonged exclusively to the state.
This traditional position that had previously justified non-intervention
in issues that fell within the domestic jurisdiction of a country (such
57 U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1.
" U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. 3. U.N. CHARTER art. 56 requires members of the
UN to "take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER art. 68 mandates the Economic
and Social Council "to set up commissions in economic and social fields for the
promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the
performance of its functions."
" UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS art. 25, para. 1 provides that
"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (IMI), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. (Resolution,
partl), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 127
(1949) [hereinafter UDHR].
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as human rights) resulted in stultifying the radicalizing potential of
the international commitments on social and economic rights
contained in the ICESCR. While Western countries largely
downplayed the significance of social and economic rights because
of their socialist inclinations, critics countered that these rights were
indispensable since they promised to make freedom more functional
in redressing poverty, inequalities and social hierarchies. The
assertion that sovereignty and the non-intervention norm are in the
process of breaking down is therefore associated with a radicalizing
potential.
The significance of the International Bill of Rights infusing
international law with a social character in part arises from its utility
in justifying the incorporation of human rights as an integral aspect
of economic development in general, and in radicalizing the basic
needs critique of growth-driven economic development by changing
the concept of needs to rights.60 Human rights advocates sought to
radicalize the weak approach to basic needs by framing them as legal
rights or entitlements; however, the approach fell short because it
failed to adequately challenge the balance of wealth, power and
resources and to treat fundamental needs as 'claims' that were part of
a history of injustice and structural disadvantage. Instead, the focus
was on justifying the international legal commitments of the
organizations within the emerging international human rights
framework.
In the context of the World Bank's basic needs strategy,
human rights advocates began to inject international human rights
into the agenda of economic development. In the 1970s and early
1980s, this approach laid the foundation for human rights groups and
activists to lobby the World Bank to convince it to address the
60 FRANCES STEWART, PLANNING TO MEET BASIC NEEDS 8 (1985). Stewart
argues that the basic needs approach to development arose in response to two
particular events: first, the failure of 'growth only' development in the 1950's and
1960's; and secondly, the overwhelming success of Socialist countries such as Cuba
and China in raising welfare levels.
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poverty issue through concepts such as the right to development, in
general, and people-centered development in particular.6
III. GOOD GOVERNANCE - A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT?
From the late 1980's, U.S. based international human rights
non-governmental organizations, such as the Lawyers' Committee for
Human Rights, formally began lobbying the World Bank to condition
its assistance on the observance of civil and political rights, such as
those relating to freedom of expression, assembly and association.62
Previously, the Bank had conditioned its assistance, in developing
countries, on changes that were consistent with or necessary to
implement market reforms. This approach differs fundamentally from
the basic needs framework which human rights advocates sought to
radicalize. Yet, both the good governance and basic needs/rights
strategy began to develop and grow within the World Bank's
predefined programs and priorities.63
61 See Rajni Kothari, Party and State in Our Times: The Rise ofNonparty Political
Formation, 9 ALTERNATIVES 541-64(Spring). For a sympathetic view of NGO
participation at the Bank see generally SAMUEL PAUL & ARTURO ISRAEL,
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK - COOPERATION FOR
DEVELOPMENT (1991). For a critical view of the role of NGOs at the Bank see
PAULNELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE
LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1995). See e.g., Clarence Dias & James
C.N. Paul, Developing Legal Strategies to Help Combat Rural Impoverishment:
Using Human Rights and Legal Resources, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF
RURAL POVERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD: ISSUES FOR RESEARCH AND ACTION BY
GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND LEGALACTIVISTS 231, 231-267 (David Dembo
ed., 1986).
62 Its first report was, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD
BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). It was revised and updated in
August 1995. The Lawyers Committee organized a workshop in 1993 to benefit
from the 'successful' efforts of environmentalists to lobby the Bank to consider
environmental considerations in its lending programs. Id. at 2-3 and 109-117.
63 Human rights NGO's therefore replicated a pattern which humanitarian and
development NGO's had completed in the 1970's. Developing NGO/World Bank
cooperation resulted in partnerships between these NGO's and the World Bank
which included representation and participation of NGO's in World Bank decision
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While in the 1970s, the weak version of the basic needs
approach provided human rights advocates with a foothold with
which to question and therefore seek to expand development defined
solely in terms of growth, during the 1990s, the good governance
agenda went further by making explicit reference to human rights,
especially to civil and political rights. As such, the good governance
framework incorporates human rights within its definition. Although
the World Bank is prohibited by its Articles of Agreement from
interfering in the internal affairs of its member countries, or from
engaging in political activities (or non-economic issues) such as
human rights advocacy, several complementary connections have
been demonstrated between the Bank's economic and financial
mandate, on the one hand, and human rights, democratization, and
political institutions within developing countries, on the other. These
connections justified bringing human rights issues within the scope
of the Bank's mandate. One recent Bank publication on governance
therefore states:
Although human rights are in a larger sense
indivisible, the World Bank, as an international
financial institution, deals with those aspects of
human rights relevant to its mandate. Except in
situations where the violation of human rights has
created conditions hostile to effective implementation
of projects or has other adverse economic
consequences, or where there are international
obligations relevant to the Bank, Such as those
making forums; joint-funding or co-financing schemes involving World Bank
financing together with privately raised capital to undertake projects ranging from
education to health. This role conveniently serves the neo-liberal agenda very well
today since NGO's often serve the role of making good the deficiencies of state
provision and delivery of basic services. Geof Wood, States Without Citizens: The
Problem of the Franchise State, in NGO'S, STATES AND DONORS Too CLOSE FOR
COMFORT (1997) argues that NGO's have taken over the provision of important
services which is a reflection of their privatization and loss of accountability.
Wood calls this phenomenon franchising out state functions to NGO's. See id. at
79-102.
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mandated by binding decisions of the U.N. Security
Council, the World Bank does not take into account
the political dimensions of human rights in its lending
decisions. The World Bank's Articles of Agreement
prohibit the institution from taking political
considerations into account, interfering in the political
affairs of any country, or being affected by the
political form or orientation of a country.64
Ibrahim Shihata, (the Bank's General Counsel), elaborates this
position further when he observes that the World Bank's decisions on
lending may be influenced by a country's political situation only
where such a situation has a direct effect not only on its economy, but
also on the feasibility of the implementation and monitoring of the
World Bank's economic reform programs. In these circumstances,
human rights may [to some extent] become relevant, but "the degree
of respect paid by a government to human rights cannot by itself be
considered an appropriate basis for the Bank's decision to make loans
to that government or for the voting of its Executive Directors."65
6 WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE 53 (1994). For
much more expansive readings of the Bank's mandate in the area of human rights,
see generally Victoria E. Mamorstein, World Bank Power to Consider Human
Rights factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L. L & ECON. 113 (1978); Human
Rights, Politics and the Multilateral Development Banks 6 YALE STUD. IN WORLD
PuB. ORD. 362 (1980).
65 Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal
Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 39, 47
(1988). In a more recent article, Ibrabim Shihata, Democracy and Development,
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 640 seems to note an exception where the World Bank can
take into account "pervasive violations of... rights to the extent that they have
obvious and significant effects on the economy of the country it assists." Id. This
is in addition to situations in which human rights may be shown to have a direct
relevance to the World Bank's mandate of economic reform. IBRAHIM SHIHATA,
THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991). Shihata notes that
circumstances that may jeopardize a loan or a Bank project which may threaten the
standing of the Bank in financial markets or could lead to adversely affecting its
reputation need to be taken into account by the Bank. He gives the example of "the
partial or full occupation of a country by a foreign army or civil strife... cannot
be deemed irrelevant to the Bank's work because they are of a political nature."
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In the period prior to the good governance era, the World
Bank restricted itself to conditioning its loan and assistance programs
only to those economic and financial conditions that fell within its
mandate to ensure loan repayment. These conditions could relate to
change in tax or commercial laws, but not to explicitly political
criteria such as respect for human rights, democratization, or the
nature of political institutions. It is argued that the good governance
agenda has changed the view of the linkage between political and
economic performance within the World Bank's lending programs by
explicitly acknowledging that a country's performance on issues such
as the nature of its political institutions, elections and democratization
constituted an important framework for successful economic
adjustment. In this way, the good governance agenda sought to
modify the view of economics as a form of mechanics divorced from
social structures adopted by economists within the Bank and
conservative commentators of the Bank's work.6 The importance of
this linkage was only secondarily important for human rights or
democratization, because, in general, good governance rests on
concepts of political economy which link governmental behavior or
interference in the market place with dismal economic performance
and infringement of rights related thereto. In other words, improved
economic growth, not democratization or respect for social and
economic rights, is the central commitment of the good governance
agenda.
He proceeds to refer to a long-standing World Bank policy paper on this issue
which has long recognized that the Bank "cannot ignore conditions of obvious
internal political instability or uncertainty which may directly affect the economic
prospects of a borrower." WORLD BANK, IDA AND IFC, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS
43 (1968). He notes, however, that "it is important to recall that in such situations
the Bank would still be taking into account economic considerations; political
events would represent only the historical origins or causes which gave rise to such
considerations." Id. at 76.
6 Esker Toyo, The Return of Political Economy: A Contribution to the History
and Typology of Economic Analysis, in ECONOMIC PAPERS, CENTRAL SCHOOL OF
PLANNING AND STATISTICS IN WARSAW, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, No. 15, 170 (1987).
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Hence, good governance discussions rest on the central
premise that governmental intervention can inhibit economic growth
through its pervasive powers of sanctions, approvals, licencing,
quotas, taxes and subsidies, and public provision of infra-structural
facilities.67 These debates on good governance argue that economic
policy is the outcome of "interactions among politicians, bureaucrats
and interest groups operating within a set of institutional
constraints,"68 rather than "merely a response to economic parameters
and concerns with efficiency." 69 Good governance is seen, therefore,
as an antidote to these interventions (in borrower countries), as a
result of its commitment to economic liberalization through reforms
in the law, the public sector, and the judiciary.
The good governance agenda has therefore provided the
World Bank a window through which to undertake reforms in areas
that would otherwise be considered political interventions. The good
governance agenda popularizes these reforms as important
preconditions (or the enabling environment in the World Bank's
jargon) for successful neo-liberal reform, rather than impermissible
political interventions in sovereign countries. At the heart of the
good governance agenda is the imperative to promote an enabling
environment as a prerequisite for successful implementation of the
neo-liberal agenda.70
Therefore, I argue that the explicit reference to human rights
and democratization in the good governance agenda must be
understood in the context of this larger debate centered on
demonstrating the adverse effects of governmental intervention in the
economy. This explicit reference to human rights in the good
governance agenda lends credence to this anti-statist agenda in view
67 See Subraj B. Gupta, Why Political Economy, INDIAN ECON. REV., 286-287
(1992).
68 STEPHEN HAGGARD & STEVEN B. WEBB, VOTING FOR REFORM: DEMOCRACY,
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 3 (1994).
69 Id.
70 For a critical overview of this agenda, see generally Anne Orford & Jennifer
Beard, Making the State Safe for the Market: The World Bank's World
Development Report 1997, 22 MELB. UNIV. L. R., 195 (1998).
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of the history of human rights abuses committed by sub-Saharan
African states. It also gives moral credibility to the World Bank in
general. While the good governance agenda does not itself constitute
a legally binding commitment that the Bank would independently use
to promote human rights, it could use its economic leverage on
developing countries to withhold extension of credit to governments
that default on internationally recognized human rights principles. As
already seen, violations of human rights do not automatically trigger
exercise of this leverage; instead, there has to be a connection to the
Bank's economic and financial mandate before this leverage could be
exercised.7
The Bank boasts that its efforts in alleviating poverty
constitute an important human rights role, since 'no other human
right could be fully enjoyed' if freedom from poverty was not
addressed.72 However, there is a simple response to this very
opportunistic claim. Poverty alleviation not only features tangentially
in its (the Bank's) lending programs, but it is also based on a weak
approach to basic needs insofar as it takes for granted and fails to
challenge the existing disparities of wealth and power within
borrowing countries as well as within the international order.
Moreover, because human rights groups have lobbied the
Bank to incorporate 'the human rights component' (civil and political
71 The selectivity of the Bank's use of its leverage only in cases it considers are
directly related to its mandate has been confined to very few cases. Kenya and
Malawi are good examples. However, the Bank has continued its lending programs
in the overwhelming number of cases where systematic human rights abuses have
occurred. These countries include, Indonesia, China, Morocco and Zaire. See
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE
AND HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 37-42 (discussing countries receiving World
Bank assistance notwithstanding their adverse human rights record); see also id. at
56-60 (discussing suspension of aid to Kenya (in 1991) and Malawi (in 1992)
through the Paris Consultative Creditors meetings chaired by the World Bank.
72 Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 62. This position is recently
restated in, WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK (September 1998). Similarly, the World Bank claims that consistent
its Articles of Agreement, "the focus of the Bank's efforts in the area of human
rights is on those rights that are economic and social in nature." WORLD BANK,
GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 64, at 53.
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as well as social and economic rights), into its pre-defined programs,
the World Bank has seized onto this fact to claim that it has the
backing of these groups without making any serious commitment to
them or their cause. Consequently, it is not surprising that the
exercise of the Bank's so-called commitments under the good
governance agenda to withhold extension of credit to governments
failing to meet certain human rights standards cannot be said to have
occurred with any regularity or consistency as the prevalence of
human rights abuses in sub-Saharan African countries that continue
receiving World Bank loans show.73 After all, these commitments
under the good governance agenda are, in the World Bank's legal
department's interpretation, non-binding.
A. Institutional Specialization - Good Governance Invokes
Functionalism to Analogize EBRD and IBRD Mandates
The World Bank's non-binding approach to international
human rights norms has also been adopted by the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development ("EBRD"). While the Articles of
Agreement explicitly require that in borrower countries, questions
concerning the rule of law, democracy, and human rights shall be
considered in the EBRD's work, they do not specifically require that
human rights violations be taken into account unless they are related
to the EBRD's mandate on economic and financial matters. The
provisions on the rule of law, democracy and human rights in the
EBRD's Articles of Agreement have therefore been interpreted
restrictively, as declarations of commitment or intent, which do not
constitute enforceable legal obligations.74 Herbert Morais, an IMF
" Against this background, different meanings of governance have proliferated
to arrest the possibility of closing the rhetorical politics-economics dichotomy.
Hence, for example, governance has according to the World Bank also meant
ownership of reforms. The shifting meanings exemplify its centrality as a strategic
discursive terrain.
74 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEvELOPMENT (1997); EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT,
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN IN RELATION TO ETHNIC
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Deputy General Counsel, has also argued that the inclusion of the
provisions on democracy, the rule of law and human rights, "reflects
an evolution in the thinking of the international donor community that
suggests a larger role and responsibility for international financial
institutions."75  Such statements demonstrate an explicit
acknowledgment of the importance of human rights within the
development work of international financial institutions, but suggest
that human rights play a subsidiary role in the overall goals of these
institutions. This restrictive understanding in the context of the
World Bank's mandate is epitomized in Professor Reisman's
argument that there is a limit to the 'institutional elasticity' to which
institutions such as the World Bank could be 'stretched' to justify the
assumption of "human rights functions, especially when these
functions are accomplished at the expense of their manifest
functions."76 Shihata adds that the cost of politicizing international
financial institutions 'further,' by assuming human rights functions
notwithstanding their (i.e. human rights) 'moral purpose,' "could
undermine their (i.e., 'the institutions') standing in financial markets
and their ability to play the role for which they were established.
77
Therefore, internationally recognized human rights principles
have played and will continue to play a marginal role within the
World Bank's good governance agenda and/or within the EBRD,
unless they can be defined in a functional or technocratic manner
which serves the major goals of economic and financial reform. In
Eastern and Central Europe the EBRD promotes these reforms by
MINORITIES (1993). See also IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUENT AGREEMENTS (1990). See also Shihata, Democracy and
Development, supra note 65, at 639 (suggesting that the transition to multiparty
democracy provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the EBRD are secondary,
since the 'economic transition to markets is the first and foremost' purpose of the
EBRD).
7' Herbert V. Morais, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Coping With Crisis, 90 AM.
SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 433 (1996).
76 W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differenciated
Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IOwA L. REV. 395 (1987).
77 Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 65, at 642.
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providing financing to accelerate the transition from planned to
market economies. The World Bank and the IMF promote these
reforms through their structural adjustment lending programs that
facilitate adoption of a free market as opposed to state allocation of
resources in developing countries throughout the world. In the official
publications of the World Bank's legal department, the former
General Counsel (Ibrahim Shihata) took the position that the
institution's special, legal personality or 'non-political' character
within the United Nations family of member organizations prevents
it from active involvement in human rights issues, since it would be
inconsistent with its Articles of Agreement. Other specialized
agencies of the United Nations family of organizations, such as the
UNDP, UNESCO, and WHO, are mandated under the United Nations
Charter and their respective constitutional mandates to cooperate in
the realization of the U.N. objectives, such as the protection of
international human rights. However, because both the IMF and the
World Bank are autonomous, they are supposed to avoid political and
other issues that could compromise their effective operation as
financial and economic organizations.78
The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development7 9 (the World Bank) and its
71 The International Labor Organization, for example is bound to "co-operate with
the Economic and Social Council in furnishing such information and rendering
such assistance to the security council as that council may request including
assistance in carrying out decisions of the security council for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security," Article VI, Agreement between the
United Nations and the International Labor Organization. Similar provisions bind
other bodies such as the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International
Civil Aviation Organization.
79 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), Article V(5)(c) provides that the:
President officers and staff ofthe Bank, in the discharge of their
offices owe their obligation entirely to the Bank and to no
authority. Each member of the bank shall respect the
international character of this duty and shall refrain from all
attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of their duties.
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relationship agreement with the United Nations, 8° require the Bank to
act as an independent organization in view of the nature of its
banking and finance functions.81 The premise of this independence is
that, in order to retain the confidence of the investment market, the
conduct of the Bank's activities must remain beyond the political
control of the United Nations.82 In addition, Ibrahim Shihata, argues
that the 'predominantly financial character' of the Bank makes it
inappropriate for it to get 'directly' involved in 'politically charged
areas' in view of the danger they pose in politicizing the Bank's work
and jeopardizing its credibility, not only in the financial markets, but
also in 'the member countries where it lends.'
83
Like the World Bank, the IMF also claims autonomy from the
U.N. under its Articles of Agreement 84 and its Relationship
Agreement with the United Nations.85 They both have autonomous
control over their membership, and financial, budgetary and policy
formulation and implementation. With respect to the IMF, it is
debatable whether this autonomy extends to decisions made by the
'0 Relationship Agreement between the IBRD and the United Nations, Nov. 15,
1947 provides at Article 1 (2) by "reason of the nature of its international
responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is, and is
required to act as an independent international organization."
81 John Eastaby notes that according to David Mitrany's theory of functionalism,
upon which the autonomy of the World Bank and IMF is based, it is presumed
that: "international organization and transnational activity create and reflect the
gradual emergence of a new type of political organization that goes beyond the
nation state," JOHN EASTABY, FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE: THE
CREDIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND LEADERSHIP 1, 3 (1985). He also
notes that according to the theory of functionalism, "the development of universal
or near universal scientific/economic society means that for decisive purposes the
state is obsolete." Id. at 9
82 See C. Wilfred Jenks, Co-Ordination in International Organization: An
Introductory Survey, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 45 (1951).
83 See Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 65, at 642.
' Article X of the IMF's Articles of Agreement requires empowers the IMF to co-
operate within the terms of its Articles of Agreement, "with any general
international organization having specialized responsibilities in related fields."
8" Article 1 (2) of the Relationship Agreement Between the IMF and the UN,
requires the IMF by virtue of its nature and international responsibilities the "to act
as an independent international organization."
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Security Council under the UN's power to safeguard international
peace and security as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1
6
By contrast, as I noted above, the World Bank acknowledges that
Security Council decisions may be binding on it.
Moreover, the World Bank further argues that its obligation
to cooperate in the effective protection of international human rights
is not legally binding. In its view, its obligation is merely to:
'note the obligations' assumed by its members who are also
members of the United Nations;87
have 'due regard' for decisions of the Security Council in the
conduct of their activities;88 and
assist the Security Council to the !fullest extent practicable'
in the 'exchange of information and publications of mutual
interest, and furnishing of special reports and studies upon
request.'
89
86 Article X (3) of the IMEF-UN Relationship Agreement and Article X (4) of the
IBRD-UN Relationship Agreement.
17 Article VI (1) of the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the IBRD
states that the "Bank takes note obligations assumed, under paragraph 2 of Article
48 of the United Nations Charter, to carry out the decisions of the security council
through their action in appropriate specialized agencies of which they are members,
and will, in the conduct of its activities have due regard for the decisions of the
security council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter." See also
Article VI (1) of the Relationship Agreement between the IMT and the UN.
88 Id.
89 Article V and VI (2) of the Relationship Agreement between the IMF and the
UN. See also Article V and VI (2) of the Relationship Agreement between the
IBRD and the UN. Article III of the Agreement between the IMF and UN, provides
that in "preparing the agenda for meetings of the Board of Governors, the Fund will
give due consideration to the inclusion in the agenda of items proposed by the
United Nations. Similarly, the Council and its commissions and Trusteeship
Council will give due consideration to the inclusion in their agenda of items
proposed by the Fund." See also Article HI of the Agreement between the IBRD
and the UN. Article V (8) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement stipulates that the
"Bank, within the terms of this Agreement, shall co-operate with any general
international organization and with public international organizations having
specialized responsibilities in related fields. Any arrangements for such co-
operation which would involve the modification of any provision of this
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These non-binding requirements form the basis of the World Bank's
claim of autonomy from the operations of the United Nations in so far
as they relate to questions of international human rights. 90
In fact, Article IV (3) of the Relationship Agreement between
the World Bank and the UN provides that any action to be taken by
the Bank on any loan would be determined by the independent
exercise of the Bank's own judgement in accordance with its Articles
of Agreement. Consequently, although the World Bank's good
governance agenda--a non-binding policy agenda--refers to human
rights as part of its governance concept, the Bank's legal department
asserts that human rights are political issues beyond the Bank's
constitutional mandate. In the view of the Bank's former General
Counsel, these issues would best be achieved by the institutions that
are under the United Nations framework, such as the "regional
agencies, courts, commissions and the non-governmental
organizations established for this purpose."91 In essence, the Bank's
arguments elevate the virtues of functional competence and
institutional specialization to preclude proposals to have the Bank
adopt human rights promotion as part of its mandate. In Shihata's
view, it is not the role of the Bank to assume human rights
responsibilities since the U.N. has been unsuccessful in their
promotion. Rather, the international community should empower the
U.N. to undertake human rights work more effectively by giving
more resources to it. Therein lies the inefficacy of the U.N.'s
ineffectiveness in promoting human rights observance across the
world. The solution does not lie in substituting the World Bank for
the U.N. This view is also based on a view of international
Agreement may be effected only after amendment of this Agreement under Article
VII.,)
90 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990) identifies
three criteria for the autonomy of international organizations, 'a permanent
association of states with lawful objectives, equipped with organs; a distinction, in
terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its member
states' and the existence of legal powers of one or more states' Id. at 681-2. This,
however, is not the meaning of autonomy I refer to here.
9, Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 65, at 642.
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institutional specialization - that it would not be appropriate to give
ajob which lies squarely within the U.N. mandate to the World Bank.
Thus, Shihata is in accord with the theories proposed by the
founders of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1940s, who argued
for a strict separation of roles between the political organs of the
United Nations, on the one hand, and the Bretton Woods institutions
as financial and banking organs on the other.
92
By contrast, in the late 1980s when the good governance
discourse was still a novel idea, Shihata had strongly recommended
that the World Bank adopt the good governance agenda without as
many caveats. At the time, he defined the meaning of politics
relevant to interpreting the Bank's Articles of Agreement as
"belonging to or taking a side in politics or in connection with the
party system of government... as well as the political principles,
convictions and opinions or sympathies of a person or party."93 This
definition of politics in turn enabled Shihata to advise the World
Bank that the adoption of the good governance agenda, with the
human rights component, was not inconsistent with the Bank's
mandate.94
92 Id. Shihata also argues that the "creation of the office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights is a clear recognition of an appropriate allocation
of roles in this field." Id. at 642. In the inaugural meeting of the establishment of
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in March 1946, Lord Keynes
is reported to have 'warned' that "if these institutions are to win the full confidence
and support of the suspicious world, it must not only be, but appear, that their
approach to every problem is absolutely objective and ecumenical without
prejudice or favor," (quoted in R. HARROD, THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
623 (1951).
93 SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 65, at 69. In
this Shihata was following Harry D. White, one of the drafters of the Bank's
Articles of Agreement who stated that its impartiality when it came to political
ideologies and interests, highlighted its non-political character and universality.
The association of secular liberal institutions with universality and above-politics
posture disguises the liberal democratic commitment to capitalism.
9" See e.g., Ibrahim Shihata, Legal Memorandum of the Vice-President and
General Counsel, Prohibition of Political Activities Under the IBRD Articles of
Agreement and Its Relevance to the Work of the Executive Directors, World Bank,
Document SecM87-1409, December 23, 1987 -Limited Circulation; The World
Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of
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Several hypotheses may be advanced to explain Shihata's
later reservations on the consistency of the good governance agenda
with the Bank's institutional mission for which support is found in
the Bank's Articles of Agreement. First, his unease may be
accounted for by the fact that the good governance agenda has shifted
away from social and economic rights, or addressing questions of
poverty and disadvantage, by giving disproportionate attention to
civil and political rights that are necessary to create an enabling
environment for market reform. Shihata's modified view seeks to
tinker with this preoccupation with creating an enabling environment
by arguing that human rights issues within the good governance
agenda must not overlap with the functions of the United Nations
which is charged with the primary responsibility of fulfilling the
human rights mandate in the U.N. family of institutions. Hence by
invoking the idea of institutional specialization and the autonomy of
the World Bank from the political organs of the U.N., Shihata
downplays the argument that a human rights agenda would be
inconsistent with the Bank's economic and financial mandate. This
is because downplaying the inconsistency between the Bank's
mandate and a human rights agenda favors a stronger emphasis on the
Bank fulfilling social and economic rights work through its anti-
poverty programs - social safety nets as opposed to merely promoting
civil and political rights that would create an enabling environment
Achievements 17 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39 (1988); see SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 65. In this last book, Shihata embraced
the notion of governance notwithstanding its explicit incorporation of human
rights. In that book, he argued in part that the prohibition on involvement in
political affairs in the World Bank's Articles of Agreement presumed that it was
certain what is meant by political affairs, political character and economic
considerations in the context of the Articles provisions. He argued that these
provisions presumed that political and economic matters were separate from each
other and as such wondered if it was realistic for the World Bank to assume that it
could insulate its decisions from political considerations. Id. at 67. He also
remarked that there was no legal remedy or recourse available to the Bank's Board
of Governors to challenge a vote made on the basis of unexpressed political
motivations. Id. at 75. These sort of remarks indicate a willingness to embrace the
good governance agenda in this early period.
GOOD GOVERNANCE
for market reforms. Second, Shihata's change of views could also be
interpreted as arising from the time lag during which the initial
excitement surrounding the linkage between human rights and the
Bank's work moved from rhetoric to policy - policy could only
marginally incorporate an explicit human rights policy, while rhetoric
could sell good governance in any formulation since rhetoric, unlike
a constitutional mandate would not be considered binding. In fact,
the Bank's economic reform programs have benefitted from their
association with human rights made as part of the good governance
agenda. My argument here is that the good governance agenda is the
primary means through which the World Bank has created for itself
a favorable public image - by focusing attention away from its
socially disastrous economic programs and its profit making lending
programs. In so doing, the World Bank succeeded in associating itself
with public virtue and initiatives such as human rights which have
achieved an acceptable minimum standard of good governance. The
point that is rarely noticed though, is that the Bank simultaneously
promotes its socially disastrous programs, while successfully creating
an image of itself as an international citizen that cares about whether
the recipients of its loans uphold the high moral standards
international society has come to place on them by their observance
of human rights. In this way, the Bank is able to appear to have a
positive social consciousness through its publicity of a commitment
to the protection of interest in human rights. Consequently, one may
read Shihata's more subtle definition of the role of rights in the World
Bank's work as part and parcel of a strategy of defusing and
appropriating human rights opposition to World Bank policies.
B. The Fallacy and Strategic Utility of the Non-Political Mandate
The foregoing arguments illustrate the decreasing emphasis
of the World Bank on the notion that its mandate is non-political as
a justification for involvement in human rights issues at all costs.
Instead, the World Bank invokes this non-political argument more
subtly by arguing that its work in the area of human rights must be
consistent with its overall economic and financial mission. Indeed,
there are several problems with maintaining a strict separation of
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politics and economics. For example, both the World Bank and the
IMF are political institutions -- despite the fact that both purport to
produce objective economic analysis. As Alice Amsden notes, the
World Bank's "middle management is comprised of many highly
respected economists while its top management is comprised of
political appointees who serve at the discretion of the industrialized
countries, especially the United States." The same can be said of the
IMF, which implies that the operations of these IFI's are therefore
affected by the activities of their contributors, especially the United
States and Japan.95
It would, therefore, be paradoxical for both the World Bank
and the IMF to insist on a strict interpretation of their roles as being
essentially non-political as required under their respective Articles of
Agreement. Article IV (10) of the World Bank's Articles of
Agreement provides that the "bank and its officers shall not interfere
in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in
their decision by the political character of the member or members
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
decisions, and these considerations are weighted impartially., 96 The
IMF's Articles of Agreement have been interpreted as having a
similar prohibition of engagement in the political affairs of its
members.
97
Until recently, when the argument of institutional
specialization became popular, this two-pronged argument (that the
9s This autonomy can only be regarded as illusory. Alice H. Amsden, Why Isn't
the World Bank Experimenting with the East Asian Model to Develop?: Review of
the East Asian Miracle, 22 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 627 (1994). See also B.S.
BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK -
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (1992).
96 Articles of Agreement of the World Bank art. IV (10). Article III (5) (b)
provides that the "bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any
loan are used only for the purpose for which the loan was granted, with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to
political or other non economic influences or considerations." Id. art. 3 (5) (b).
97 Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited By Articles of Agreement
when the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, IMF SURVEY, May 9,
1983 at 146-148.
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IFIs are autonomous from the 'political conflicts' of the U.N. and the
prohibition against involvement in the political affairs of member
states), has been the foundation for the World Bank's and the IMF's
explanation for the marginal influence of international human rights
principles in the IFIs' decision-making. 98 The IMF's Guidelines
Regarding Good Governance, adopted by its Board of Directors in
July, 1997, is more techno-economic than that of the World Bank.99
The IMF defines good governance primarily in terms of its
constitutional mandate. It is related primarily to the transparency of
the government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource
management, and the stability and transparency of economic and
regulatory environment for private sector activity. In the IMF's view,
good governance refers to those economic reforms which countries
have to undertake in order to establish credibility and receive support
from IFIs and trading and lending markets. In addition to the view
that the IM's international legal responsibilities (under their Articles
of Agreement) require them to function as independent and 'non-
political' actors, these concerns form another important basis to
explain the marginal incorporation of international human rights as
decision-making criteria in the functioning of IFIs.
In view of the Bank's restrictive mandate, the Bank's good
governance agenda has been praised for incorporating human rights,
albeit in a marginal way, into the World Bank's decision-making
" There is precedent in the history of the World Bank's operations to suggest that
it will not comply with the decisions of UN bodies on questions of international
human rights involving international peace and security issues. Samuel A. Bleicher,
UN v. IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism 24 INT'L ORG. 31 (1970). In this case,
the World Bank refused to follow General Assembly and Security Council
Resolutions calling for suspension of lending to South Africa and Portugal. The
former for continuation of its apartheid policies and the latter for continuation of
its colonial policy in Africa. Both situations were determined both by the Security
Council and the General Assembly as constituting threats to international peace and
security. See id. at 38.
99 See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE, THE
IMF's ROLE (1997).
1999 157
158 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 5
process on loans, through the concept of political conditionality.' °
However, human rights advocacy only seems to engage the lending
practices in the project cycle after they have already been
conceptualized. Therefore, political conditionality or good
governance primarily leaves the economic programs promoted by
these institutions intact. The project cycle is simply the process of
giving practical effect to these pre-conceptualized programs of the
IFIs. It consists mostly of the process of disbursement of loan funds
from "project identification to preparation, appraisal, negotiation,
implementation and supervision and finally evaluation."' 
0 1
In addition, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and the
World Bank limit the scope of political conditionality to only those
considerations that affect the economic factors which justify loan
disbursement. 0 2 Political conditionality, therefore, focuses on the
behavior of the borrowing state and primarily leaves the economic
programs promoted by these institutions intact.
'00 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992); GOVERNANCE:
THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 64; IMF, supra note 90; Pierre
Dhonte, Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility: Paper on Policy
Analysis and Assessment, I.M.F. African Dept., PPAA/97/2 (1997).
"O! See Jonathan Cahn, The World Bank and the Democratization of Development,
6 HARV. HuM. RTs. L.J. 160, 170-71 (1993). James C.N. Paul argues that the failure
to take rights seriously at every stage of the project cycle could result in
development projects inimical to humane development since the "effective, self-
reliant participation is essential to the design as well as the implementation,
monitoring and regulation of all development projects which affect particular
groups in particular ways." James C.N. Paul, International Development Agencies,
Human Rights and Humane Development Projects, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
70 (1988),
102 This interpretation is confirmed in a recent legal opinion by the World Bank's
chief legal counsel to the Bank's Executive Directors. Ibrahim Shihata, Prohibition
of Political Activities in the Bank's Work, World Bank, U.N. Doc. SecM95-707
(1995). Susan Strange notes that the World Banks' agenda on governance
"requires a lot of fancy footwork because the Bank's own charter says it can only
deal with economic development, and it must not intervene in the political affairs
of its members." Susan Strange, The World Bank and its Concept of Governance,
in THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DISEMPOWERMENT: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE THIRD WORLD 206 (1995).
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Hence, while claims have been made about the erosion of the
traditional legal norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, these
classical positions in international law are still defended by the IFIs.
The World Bank cites its constituent instrument, the IBRD Articles
of Agreement, to support the view that human rights are a political
issue which fall outside the Bank's mandate unless defined in a
technical or functional mode - to fit within the Bank's economic and
financial goals.103 In addition, the World Bank continues to argue
.that the political sovereignty of its member countries must still be
respected.
The good governance agenda confers the World Bank with
flexibility to define those issues which fit within this techno-
economic logic and those that do not; and thus to characterize
ostensibly political issues as neutral.1 4 Here, the agenda proceeds
103 David Gillies also notes that there are at least two versions of governance
emerging from the World Bank: first, a narrow version that focuses on technical
criteria connected to efficiency and excludes consideration of most civil and
political rights. See David Gillies, Human Rights, Governance and Democracy:
The World Bank's Problem Frontiers, 11 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. (1993).
Here, the Bank is involved in projects considered to be of direct relevance to its
mandate such as public sector management and strengthening legal and judicial
frameworks; and second, a broader definition that concedes that sovereignty is not
sacrosanct and acknowledges that the core characteristics of governance are in
large measure driven from or are related to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See id. at 13. Shihata notes that there are three tests to determining an
economic effect of a Bank operation is direct and obvious. Ibrahim Shihata, Legal
Opinion on Governance, supra note 102. The economic effect must be: (I) clear
and unequivocal; (ii) preponderant; and (iii) when the issue is associated with
political actions or flows from political events, the economic effect "must be of
such impact and relevance as to make it a Bank concern." Id.
"0 Neo-liberal economic restructuring analytically distinguishes or creates
boundaries between a political arena that is formally based in ideals of equality and
participation on the one hand, and an economic arena based on the institution of
private property and the integration of national economies into an ostensibly
neutral international market on the other hand. The falsity of this distinction is less
important than the fact that in the context of deep social and economic inequalities
of sub-Saharan African countries, the distinction serves to perpetuate very
minimalist political enfranchisement, with simultaneous economic
disenfranchisement of a whole lot of others. According to Karl Kare, "economists
and social theorists have tended to treat the question of precisely how the ground
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from two basic and questionable assumptions; first, that economic
reform based on a free market model is governed by apolitical,
techno-economic logic; and second, that important market reform
concepts, such as private property rights and freedom of contract,
"connote a fixed set of institutional and legal arrangements, and
relatively sharp and precise criteria for distinguishing 'market' from
'non-market' institutions.'
The good governance agenda passes itself off as apolitical
since its promoters presume that the promotion of sound development
management constitutes technical, administrative, and economic tasks
that do not involve political choices. As alluded to above, good
governance reform became popular in the 1980s with the rise of neo-
liberalism. To implement this type of neo-liberal reform, the World
Bank exercises:
[P]ower through its financial leverage to legislate
entire legal regimens and even to alter the
constitutional structure of borrowing nations. Bank-
approved consultants often rewrite a country's trade
policy, fiscal policies, civil service requirements,
labor laws, health care arrangements, environmental
regulations, energy policy, resettlement requirements,
procurement rules, and budgetary policy.'° 6
These reforms have also been perceived as containing a
specific built-in logic, as if the market manifests itself in only one
definite identifiable form. This is illustrated by the absolutist idea of
private property promoted by the neo-liberal agenda. However,
private property connotes at least two simultaneous contradictory
rules [for a market economy] are defined as a technical matter for the attention of
lawyers." Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections
in 1989, in A FOuRTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF
NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 314 (1994).
'o5 Id. at 313.
0 Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the'New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and
the Democratization of Development, 6 HARv. HuM. RTs. L. J. 160 (1993).
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meanings: first, the freedom of a property owner to use her property
as she wishes notwithstanding potential harm to others(more often
than not the idea of property embedded in the neo-liberal agenda);
and, second, that such use is subject to the peaceful and unrestricted
use of the adjoining property owner. In addition, contract law
embodies a "permanent tension between the goal of promoting
freedom of action and the goal of protecting interests in security."'
0 7
Karl Klare concludes that "the project of giving legal definition to
market structures involves making an endless series of socially
significant choices."' 8 Since markets do not possess such a built-in
legal structure, "the process of specifying the law that constructs
markets is eminently and inescapably a political project."'10 9
However, the good governance agenda defines as apolitical the
controversial, political character of the reforms initiated through neo-
liberal economic restructuring (such as those mentioned above), so
that they can be directly related to the World Bank's economic
(financial and banking) mandate. Human rights must also be defined
in this same apolitical way, in order to fit squarely within the Bank's
constitutional mandate.
It is for this reason that human rights advocates (as well as the
advocates of the NIEO and the strong version of the basic needs
approach), have found it difficult to position themselves as
independent critics to the Bank's policies. This outcome arises in a
major way from the Bank's readiness to have a dialogue on human
rights issues unlike in the pre-govemance era when human rights
issues were considered to be beyond the Bank's mandate. The good
govemance agenda has therefore provided human rights advocates an
avenue through which to talk about human rights issues with the
Bank, albeit in a very limited framework - human rights must be
defined in a manner that is consistent with the Bank's financial and
107 Klare, supra note 104, at 315.
108 Id. at 315. Klare also notes that these "background rules are not socially neutral;
they distribute power and frame the possibilities of human fulfillment." Id. at 316.
'09 Id. at 313-314. Karl Klare also notes that "legal discourse contains no neutral
logic capable of resolving contested questions of determining choices about market
structure." Id. at 315.
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economic mandate. Consequently, most human rights activists
adopted a strategy based on finding common ground between human
rights advocacy and the IFI's techno-economic policies rather than
seeking to lend outside criticism of the Bank's policies.
This new strategy of finding complementarity between human
rights and the Bank's financial and economic mandate is acceptable
to the Bank for several reasons. First, it abandons or implicitly rejects
the hostile and uncompromising opposition to international economic
policy that characterized previous initiatives to open up the Bank to
human rights issues in the pre-govemance era. Second, it is
acceptable to the Bank since it has abandoned the strong version of
basic needs or even the demands embodied in the NIEO, which were
based in part on welfare demands from the state and development
institutions.
Therefore, I have argued in this section that the good
governance proposals are part of a conservative agenda for human
rights in that it is based on establishing a connection between human
rights and the World Bank's development policies which may
themselves be inimical to the protection of human rights, and social
and economic rights. By emphasizing the supposedly reinforcing
character of human rights and economic policy, as if they were
always mutually supportive, human rights activists have established
a foothold to negotiate with the Bank. In my view, this has only
served to legitimize the economically disastrous programs of neo-
liberal economic reform embraced by the World Bank and the JMF.110
In this respect, I depart from many scholars and activists of
human rights who, in my view, have too quickly praised the World
Bank's governance agenda for incorporating ideals of democracy and
human rights, even though they are aware that the Bank's central
mission remains the extension of its economic programs, regardless
of human rights concerns. Embracing the good governance agenda
lends legitimacy to these economic programs investing them with the
'10 According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the "governance
debate looks to human rights not for their intrinsic value but for their instrumental
role in creating an environment in which effective and sustainable development can
occur." Id. at 61.
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'moral' credence that human rights and democracy struggles
represent in countries where human rights have been abused for
prolonged periods and in an international context where rights have
enjoyed preeminence in the discourses of international relations,
politics and law.
The argument that classical conceptions of sovereignty and
non-intervention are in the process of breaking down or have broken
down, or that good governance signals a departure from a previous
commitment to political authoritarianism within the economic
programs of bilateral and multilateral donors is unhelpful in analyzing
the relationship between economic reform and human rights within
the good governance agenda. As in the past, neo-liberal economic
reform is similarly committed to authoritarian governance in ways
that are not always obvious. One of the forms of authoritarianism
embodied in the neo-liberal economic agenda is its commitment to a
strong state, capable of resisting democratic forces demanding
increases in social spending. Human rights advocacy is therefore
implicated in promoting consequences adverse to the human rights
guarantees of the international bill of human rights. This outcome
arises notwithstanding the occasional criticism against some aspects
of neo-liberal project of macroeconomic reform leveled by some
human rights advocates.
C. Guaranteeing Procedural Rights: The Limited Agenda of the
Inspection Panel
In September, 1993, the World Bank created an Inspection
Panel to address complaints about Bank projects and its failure to
follow its own rules."' Outside pressure for the formation of an
independent body to review the Bank's projects and operations
resulted in the establishment of the Panel. Environmentalists and
'1 The World Bank Inspection Panel, Res No. 93-10 (1993); Operations
Inspection Function: Objectives, Mandate and Operating Procedures for an
Independent Inspection Panel, 1993. Daniel Bradlow, The World Bank Votes to
Establish Inspection Panel, THIRD WORLD DEBT IN THE 1990's, Issue 6 (1993). See
also IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994).
1999
164 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 5
popular movements in Bank-funded dam projects, such as in the
Sardar Sarovar project on the Narmarda river in Western India, and
forestry projects in the Ivory Coast and Gabon, heightened awareness
concerning the Bank's failure to resettle displaced people and to
address environmental damages caused by the Bank's projects. 112 In
fact, independent review of Bank performance confirmed that such
"problems besetting the Sardar Sarovar project are more the rule than
the exception to resettlement operations supported by the Bank.""' 3
Although it was formed only in 1993, by end of 1998 the feeble
procedural guarantees of the Inspection Panel were in serious doubt
for reasons discussed below.'
4
The Inspection Panel is composed of three members
nominated by the Bank President, with the approval of the Executive
Directors, who also have the power to fire the Panel members. The
Bank has committed itself to providing a sufficient budget for the
Panel, as well as access to Bank documents and staff. The Panel's
procedure is as follows: After receiving a request and verifying
whether it fits within its mandate, the Panel forwards the request to
the Bank Management who prepare a response to the allegations
which is submitted to the Panel. The Panel makes a preliminary
review of the request, conducts an independent assessment of the
112 See E. Christensen, Green Appeal: A Proposal for An Independent Commission
of Inquiry at the World Bank, (Natural Resources Defense Council, 1990); L. Udall
& D. Hunter, Proposal for an Independent Review Appeals Commission,
(Environmental Defense Fund and Center for International Environmental Law,
1993); P. BOSSARD ET AL., CREATING AN INDEPENDENT APPEALS COMMISSION AT
THE WORLD BANK (1993).
113 According to this internal report of Bank operations, the Bank was criticized
for failing to fully enforce 78% of financial conditions in loan agreements. Morse
Commission, Sardar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent Review, 1992. World
Bank, 1992. It also found that 37.5% of its recently reviewed projects were
unsatisfactory, up from 15% in 1981. See id. This decline in project quality was
linked to a 'pervasive' 'culture of approval' for loans which encouraged Bank staff
to perceive the appraisal process as merely a "marketing device for securing loan
approval," such that the pressure to lend overwhelmed all other considerations. See
id.
114 World Bank to Seek Comment on a Plan to Leash Watchdog, FINANCIAL TIMES,
February 2, 1999, at A14.
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merits of the Bank Management's response to it, and recommends to
the Board of Directors, (hereinafter the Board), whether the claims
should be investigated. Usually, the Panel will also make a
preliminary visit to the country to meet the requesters and to make a
preliminary investigation of the facts of the case. If the board
approves a recommendation to investigate and the scope of the
investigation, the Panel proceeds with the investigation. In those
cases where the approval is given by the Board, the Board also
releases for public information the request for inspection, the
management request and the Panel recommendation. During the
investigation phase, the Panel has access to all Bank staff and to the
relevant Bank documentation. The Panel can also conduct hearings
and site visits as part of the investigation. When the Panel finishes an
investigation, it sends its findings to the Board and to Bank
Management. Then, before the report can be released to the
Complainant, the Directors are given the responsibility of trying to
resolve any conflicts between the Panel's reports and Bank staff s
response. Bank Management then has six weeks to submit its
recommendations to the Board on what actions the Bank should take
in response to the Panel's findings. Based on the Panel's findings
and the Bank Management's recommendations, the Board takes the
final decision on what should be done.'15
The Panel may receive complaints from any 'affected party'
in the territory of the borrower, as long as it is not a single individual.
Such a party must show that its fights or interests have been or are
likely to be directly affected by any action or omission of the Bank or
where there has been a 'material adverse effect' as a 'result of a
failure by the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures
with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a
project financed by the Bank."" 6 An investigation may also'be
commenced by the Bank's Executive Directors, or, in special cases
of alleged serious violations, by any individual Director.
115 On these procedures see the Panel's website
http://www.worldbank.org/htmYins-panel-overview.html
116 World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 111.
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The Inspection Panel has been welcomed as a break with prior
Bank practice of maintaining secrecy in its operations and failing to
involve external groups and individuals in its decision making
processes.1 1 7 However, the Panel is not independent from the Bank
nor can its work fundamentally influence the Bank's operations,
especially with respect to projects whose 'visibility' is not as high as
dams or forestry projects. In a sense, the Inspection Panel gives the
World Bank an opportunity to act as a judge in its own cause--a clear
conflict of interest that contradicts established standards of natural
justice. Hence, the Panel may be seen as serving the strategic purpose
of containing legitimate protests over the Bank's projects and
operations, but only marginally. For example, the Executive
Directors must give their approval before the Panel can commence
investigations. In addition, the Bank has not made any formal
commitment to rectify problems that the Panel may reveal in its work.
The Panel is simply another one of the Bank's strategies of opening
itself up to scrutiny on its own terms, within its predefined projects
and programs and on its own turf.
118
Although the Inspection Panel provides a formal avenue for
lodging complaints, international human rights activists have found
it to be inadequate. The reasons for this are several. First, the Panel
can only examine the Bank's compliance with its own operational
guidelines. Since the Bank has not adopted a human rights policy
within these guidelines, human rights concerns appear to be outside
the Panel's mandate. Second, the Bank's operational guidelines
specify certain criteria, such as financial, institutional, technical,
sociological, and environmental considerations, which may or may
117 Another similar policy heralding in a relative openness on the Bank's
operations was the adoption of a new procedure for public disclosure of
information relating to Bank sponsored projects in September of 1993. See
SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 111, at 28-30.
"' A recent review of the Inspection Panel within the Bank has indicated a
willingness to weaken its present structure, perhaps to align it with the interests of
the United States.
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not provide some wiggle room to accommodate human rights
concerns."1
9
The Inspection Panel attracts the same criticism as the good
governance agenda. First, it is primarily concerned with the possible
shortcomings in the implementation of Bank projects, according to
the Bank's own criteria. External pressure and disagreements within
the Bank on how to implement these criteria create the space for
compliance assessment. 20 Thus, there is some truth to the claim that
involvement of non-state actors and individuals in the workings of
institutions such as the Bank are reshaping international politics.
However, such participation tends to be procedural rather than
substantive and as such, somewhat narrow. It opens up channels of
information to non-state actors to facilitate participation in decision-
making on specific issues such as the environment, but not on the
substantive agenda. Therefore, the role of non-state actors is to seek
to enforce the institutions' own internal rules of procedure and at
times to seek to enforce external criteria, such as international human
rights or international environmental obligations, where the
institutions' projects have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of
these obligations and where these obligations are directly relevant to
the Bank's economic and financial mandate.
Second, the nature of this type of advocacy is 'reactive' rather
than 'proactive' to policy choices. It has at times succeeded in
19 See, e.g., Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 10.01 on Economic Evaluation
of Investment Operations (April 1994). Notwithstanding the 'overall efficacy' of
human rights in the operations of the IFI's they "do not have well developed,
publicly available human rights," Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF
and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 51 (1996). He
argues that the IFI's should develop an "explicit human rights policy in order to
resolve the human rights problems they face." See id. at 52.
120 William Fisher, Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley, in
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT? STRUGGLING OVER INDIA'S NARMADA
RIVER 17 (William Fisher ed., 1995). Notes that to "talk of the World Bank as a
monolithic actor in the process . . . obscures the differences in opinion and
influence that exist among the members of the Bank's staff. Debate among these
factions is largely internal to the Bank and not public, but the presence of differing
points of view occasionally opens the Bank to external persuasion." See id.
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blocking policy decisions made by bureaucrats without local
community input, which endangers the environment and has adverse
social effects on the community.22 This constitutes a response to a
single event and may be an insufficient strategy for sustaining an
ongoing commitment.
2 1
Third, the participation of northern NGOs which have the
advantages of resources, 'skills' and the experience of negotiating
with institutions such as the World Bank, may themselves be
'establishment' groups that have shared commitments in the
desirability of market reform, for example. This poses a potential
conflict of interest scenario, since these groups may not wish to
critique market reforms even when they are inconsistent with human
rights guarantees. Hence, where such reforms are inimical to Third
World groups there is a danger that the human rights rhetoric of these
'establishment' groups may associate these reforms with virtues of
restraining state interference with individual rights in the market
place and in the political sphere rather than with the problems
associated with capitalist development. In other words, the credence
associated with the moral claims of human rights (as restraints against
state interference with individual freedom) is used to give legitimacy
to establishment causes that may be inimical to Third World
interests. 2 3 It seems NGOs of all shades enter into alliances with each
other and with powerful institutions on issues or agendas that are not
only predetermined, but over which they do not have much control or
power to change.
Fourth, even though public participation that results in
blocking specific policy choices puts these institutions on the
defensive, requiring them to devote resources and attention to
justifying projects which have been objected to, these participatory
opportunities rarely go beyond questioning the procedural
121 William Fisher, Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley, supra note
120, at 27.
'2 Smitu Kothari, Damming the Narmada and the Politics of Development, in
FISHER, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 120, at 423.
'2 See James Gathii & Celestine Nyamu, Reflections on United States Based
Human Rights NGO's Work on Africa, 9 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 262, 285 (1996).
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shortcomings. For example, they rarely, if ever, question the
rationale for the projects, or on a more 'radical' level, question the
'oppressive' nature of the institutions from which they emerge.
124
Fifth, the powers of the Inspection Panel have been argued to
be so broad that they constitute a constraint on the Bank's lending to
developing countries at the behest of the countries that control the
Bank.'25 This anomaly is accentuated by the fact that the Inspection
Panel does not have the powers to examine broader Bank policies
adopted with the blessing of the developed countries, (especially the
United States), than any one individual project that the Panel may
inquire into. In essence, the Inspection Panel, though established in
good faith to address problems in the implementation of Bank
projects, ended up giving enormous power to it leading to the
investment of enormous time and effort in selecting lending Bank
portfolios at the Bank, while Wall Street financiers benefitted from
the tightening of access to funds at the Bank. 26 Obviously, financing
124 See FISHER, supra note 120, at 18. Fisher also notes that with respect to the
Sardar Sarova dam project in the Narmarda Valley in India, many "critics of the
project share a set of assumptions with the proponents of the project that stress the
positive potential of development interventions initiated by the existing
development 'apparatus' (those formal national and international institutions that
plan, fund and implement development projects). See id. Criticisms of
development that emerge from this perspective assume the positive potential of
development interventions and focus on the flaws in the design, implementation or
execution, suggesting that development may require its implementers to muddle
through, to take two steps forward and one step backward.. . ." See id. at 18.
'25 However, supporters of the Inspection Panel point out its successes in at least
the following instances : an investigation into a project to build a bridge over the
Jamuna Bridge resulted in approximately 70, 000 people, who had initially been
excluded, being incorporated into the resettlement plan ; additional money was
allocated to deal with the adverse social and environmental consequences of Bank
funded projects in Brazil and Argentina; a Panel investigation led to the
cancellation of a controversial dam project in Nepal. Letter from Daniel Bradlow,
February 23, 1999 (on file with author).
26 Letter from Davesh Kapur (February 23, 1999) (on file with the author). Robert
Wade, Greening the Bank The Struggle Over the Environment, 1970-1995 in
DAVESHKAPURETAL., THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY (1997), notes
that the Panel "discourages staff from seeking imaginative and risky solutions and
causes management to steer away from projects that are inherently difficult to
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from the speculators on Wall Street for developing countries is
always a worse option relative to the Bank financing as the debt crisis
of the early 1980s illustrated.'
27
Another profound critique of these development programs or
projects could proceed in one of many ways-for example, by
examining the international development institutions and national
governments as 'structures of power' whose development programs
and projects are often clothed in 'lofty and humanitarian rhetoric,' but
in effect "help to maintain or fail to ameliorate economic and political
inequality."'28 As such, an important criticism of focusing on
procedural shortcomings is the assumption that problems of social
justice and equity can be resolved within these processes which fail
to challenge the institutional assumptions and ideological
commitments.
A radical alternative to social democracy goes beyond trying
to give international law a social conscience and beyond questioning
the normative force of concepts of modernity such as sovereignty as
markers of individual emancipation and material progress. Rather, it
challenges institutions that reinforce social division and hierarchy or
'panel proof,' such as dams. It imparts a legalistic thrust to Bank work, eclipsing
substance (as in the injunction, 'Make your projects panel-proof'), and strengthens
ab existing tendency toward 'OD [Operational Directive] absolutism,' with ODs
being interpreted by outsiders as legally binding, like laws of nation states ....
Inevitably, task managers have to be selective in deciding to which of these
hundreds of 'requirements' [referring to ODs] to pay attention, but that leaves them
and the Bank open to charges of noncompliance, now with the panel ever ready to
investigate. The counter argument is that the larger the organization, the greater the
need for rules. The Naramada experience suggests that if something is not put into
the rules (the Ods), it will typically be overlooked." Id. at 729.
127 James R. Crotty & Don Goldstein, Do U.S. Financial Markets Allocate Credit
Efficiently? The Case of Corporate Restructuring in the 1980's, in GARY A.
DYMSKI ET AL.,TRANSFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: EQUITY AND
EFFICIENCY FOR THE 21 r CENTURY (1993), notes that this speculative search was
in the 1980's accompanied by the replacement "production efficiency as the motive
force behind the restructuring movement... second- contrary to the predictions of
the academic conventional wisdom-our deregulated financial markets proved to be
shockingly inefficient as credit allocators. A radical departure from this disastrous
laissez-faire regulatory philosophy in the coming years is imperative." Id. at 255.
128 Fisher, supra note 120, at 18.
GOOD GOVERNANCE
received and inherited notions of custom, belief, and attitude, such as
an inherent human nature.12 9 The goal of this alternative approach is
a thorough reordering, remaking and reformulation of every
dimension of life and takes nothing for granted. Human rights
advocacy simply does not go this far.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the limits of human rights
advocacy, both in its effort to radicalize the weak strand of the basic
needs development strategy of the 1970s, and in its good governance
effort to integrate human rights into the growth oriented neo-liberal
economic policy of the 1990s. Both of these efforts flow from the
belief that international law must be infused with a social conscience
and that development programs must be humanized.
However, these initiatives paradoxically seem to share a belief
in the positive potential of the present, national and international
institutional apparatus and their commitment to 'development,' and
in the assumption that these institutions need only tinker with the
design, implementation, or procedures in order to humanize
development programs and turn them away from their preoccupation
with materialistic values such as economic growth.
This institutional fetishism "disconnects the formulation of
principles ofjustice from the problems of institutional design, refuses
to acknowledge the effect of established institutions and practices
upon desires and intuitions, and treats the social democratic
compromise of the postwar period as the insuperable horizon for the
pursuit of its ideals.' 130 Human rights advocacy, in both its basic
needs and good governance approach, adopts the basic tenets of a
'chastened' social democratic vision. It seeks to humanize society
129 ROBERTO MANOABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 27
(1984). Unger postulates a Christian image of the self as one simultaneously
endowed with an infinite mobility in always finite conditions, yet always with a
longing for others.
130 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
4 (1996).
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either through the promotion of basic human needs or human rights
as part of the programs of capitalist-oriented economic growth.
These approaches to human rights advocacy by and large share an
apparent constraining assumption - that established institutions such
as the international financial institutions share an intrinsic logic
which holds them together, rather than as contingent and historically
specific institutions, without any intrinsic logic that would prohibit
any attempt to redefine them.' 3
Roberto Unger's vision of a radical alternative to social
democracy proceeds from this dual observation:
the absence of an inherent nature of the self which empowers
the self with a limitless ability to transcend dependence on
collective conformity or schemes of social division,
subjugation or hierarchy; and
solidaristic connection or association of these individual
capacities of transcendence into a collective power for context
revision. In this Ungerian vision, the individual and
solidaristic capacity to transcend or revise inherited contexts
ought to be the driving force of history.
Context smashing or transcendence is, however, subject to
individual emancipation from collective conformity or schemes of
social division, subjugation and hierarchy in the first place. Only
after these individual wills are combined together in a solidaristic
union, is context-breaking or smashing then possible.
This vision of context-bashing is attractive to the radical
democrat. Its utility for both national and international reform is
indispensable. The revision of formed routines and institutional
contexts, locally and internationally, would however require more
than just a vision.
'3 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 6-7, 9, 78-79 (1987).
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The humanizing project of international human rights
advocacy has gained credibility based on its association with the real
struggles of those in poverty, economic disadvantage and against
political authoritarianism and repressive social convention. The basic
needs/rights strategy is closely connected with a commitment to a
'chastened' social democratic vision132 of meeting basic human needs,
such as food, shelter, and housing, which ameliorate misery without
fundamentally attacking the basic institutional, social, and political
contexts that sustain social dependence and inequality. The good
governance strategy on its part places priority, in developing
countries, on programs of economic reconstruction "overtly intolerant
of governmental activism in the economy and hostile to worker and
welfare rights,"'33 but also committed to civil and political liberties,
especially those of property and freedom to contract. Both of these
strategies became popular not just because they have proved to be
effective allies of the capitalist, international order within which they
operate, but also because they have simultaneously and perhaps
paradoxically become associated with humanizing commitments.
Undoubtedly, they have given this capitalist international order a
moral credibility without posing any fundamental challenge to it.
Consequently, I conclude that both the basic needs/rights
strategy and the good governance agenda bear the imprint and support
of transnational elites and interests, notwithstanding their
commitment to visions of humanizing or ameliorating the problems
132 Roberto Unger describes chastened social democracy in Western industrial
democracies as including: first, "its continuing commitment to the welfare state and
to investment in people; second, a desire to rid the regulated market economy of
statist, corporatist, and oligopolistic constraints upon economic flexibility and
innovation, especially in the transition to a postfordist style of industrial
organization, accompanied by sympathy toward bottom-up association and
participation by people in local government and social organization; and third, an
unabashed institutional conservatism, expressed in skepticism about large projects
of institutional reconstruction and in the acceptance of the current legal forms of
market economies, representative democracies and free civil societies." See Unger,
supra note 131.
13' ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYsIs BECOME?, supra note 130,
at 9.
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of our present institutional contexts. As such, divesting ourselves of
the notion that these institutions are indispensable is a useful place to
begin. However, nothing short of political struggle will realize the
vision of a new set of institutions or a redesign of the present ones.
The vested interests of transnational elites will, as always, continue
to police and constrain challenges to the status quo by allowing only
those forms of dissidence that do not go too far, while at the same
time accommodating limited visions of social democracy at the
fringes.
